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- I. *Aim*: The aim of this quarterly shall be to provide a forum (1) for the discussion of Christian faith and life on the basis of the Lutheran confession, (2) for the application of the principles of the Lutheran Church to the changing problems of religion and society, (3) for the fostering of world Lutheranism, and (4) for the promotion of understanding between Lutherans and other Christians.
- II. *Policy*: The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

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The Image of the Ministry

BY WILLIAM M. HORN

AT THE outset one recognizes the vastness and complexity of such a topic as the image of the ministry. To my knowledge no comprehensive study has been made of it; perhaps none can be made, partly because the image changes rapidly, partly because the judges must be measured as much as their judgments. A devout churchman will see the image in one way, the indifferent in another way. The Roman Catholic will view it one way, the follower of Jehovah's Witnesses another. Any instrument of measurement must take so much account of such differences as to make such an instrument impossible.

Moreover, the field is far too vast and complicated to compress into a brief article. Allusions to the image appear in almost every appraisal of American life in every decade; and the diversity of views of this image is legion. At best we can make only a partial and sketchy appraisal and draw a few tentative conclusions. And if the essay serves no more than to warm up an area of common concern and move toward some common conclusions, it will have served its purpose.

I

The term "image" has become something of a magic word of late. A cartoon in a weekly magazine depicts two boys walking out of school, books in arm, and one saying to the other, "I'm not worried about my marks; it's just making a favorable pupil image." Madison Avenue has succeeded in making us sensitive to our image. When a car is marketed, the advertiser plans his sales strategy in selecting the image to be linked with the car: the junior executive, the housewife needing a second car, the non-conformist bent on something different and sporty. He then paints the potential purchaser, always smiling, nattily attired, set in a vacation spot, loaded with peace of mind.

One social scientist traces this obsession with images back to John D. Rockefeller at a time when Standard Oil grew alarmed at the grasp-

ing, manipulating, covetous reputation it had received at the hands of the public. So it employed a public relations man to devise ways of offsetting this image. He it was who planned the strategy of picturing the aged Rockefeller handing out bright new dimes to children. I can testify to the effectiveness of this contrived program, since I grew up for years believing that John D. was the devout churchgoer, philanthropist, friend of little children this campaign said he was.

Ever since, the projection of images by contrived means and the instruments for measuring public esteem have been big business. Americans have grown sensitive to their prestige rating. They regard it as ingratitude of a baser sort for a have-not nation to receive benefactions at our hands and not render loyalty and lifelong support in return. They make campaign issues of the prestige status of our nation, whether rising or falling. They pour weekly and monthly reports from the far corners of the world into some giant UNIVAC to see what others think of us at the moment. They publish carefully-worded documents for tourist, serviceman, exchange student to heighten the image overseas. They take to heart the distorted images of America sold through motion pictures, big business enterprise, and boorish tourists.

In view of the artificiality of such an approach, one wonders how much value there be in measuring the image of the ministry. Public relations experts might do the church a world of good; but this is not the point here, to create a favorable picture of something that exists only dimly, or to gauge program and policy by the pulse reading. Our Lord had far too much to say about such procedures. In only one instance in his recorded ministry does a public image seem to concern him—when he sent his disciples out on a field trip and then asked for their reports in the famous Caesarea Philippi incident. And even then it was not to correct an impression or plan a strategy that would win popular favor.

Where the modern term "image" conjures up pictures of something contrived, manufactured, deliberate, we would not so speak here—as though to be caught standing in the marketplace at the hour of prayer, or wearing our phylacteries broad when the crowd assembles, or donning an oversized collar to give the impression of gauntness and asceticism. It is rather an overall view of the ministry today, at times

mpared with images in another day, at times as portrayed in mass media, at times as seen by students of our times.

A thesis underlies this approach: that the image of the ministry is the key in the recruitment of men for the ministry (if recruitment is the proper term for it). The very choice of this topic grows out of distaste for current appeals and approaches on the matter of ministerial recruitment: appeals that major on the dearth of candidates, blanket methods, on seeming to cajole young men to consider the ministry. A recent document on church vocations, for example, claims that 25,000 pastors are now needed by the Protestant churches of America. The President's Committee on Education foresees a need for an additional 168,750 ministers by 1975. Virtually every denomination is faced with similar figures. Churches are honored for sending sons to the ministry, with emphasis on quantity rather than quality. Church camps make strong appeals under the spell of vacation surroundings, passing out blanks to be signed. Families feel they do the church a favor when a son decides to study for the ministry, whether the church could think of selecting that son or not. Church colleges admit young men for pre-theological training who would not qualify for admission for any other reason. Seminaries complain because the ministry lays the poorer quality of ministers at the door of inept training, where the greater fault lies in the poor material they have to work with. Psychological tests now commonly made of theological students reveal weaknesses—they may have been quite as present in previous generations without being detected, without knowing whether such weaknesses would disqualify a man or not.

Against all this, a thesis is set here: that qualified men are led into the ministry more by an image of the ministry than by appeals based on need or personal gain or doing the kingdom of God a favor.

What picture does a young man have? That of a post with an automatic social status, built-in prestige, a degree of security that may not bring large financial returns but will keep a man under the care of the church for life? Is it of a career relatively free from occupational risks, where insurance companies regard him as a good risk with longer life expectancy, with only the hazards of driving a car and visiting hospitals? Is his image that of an endless round of meaningless activities—attending meetings, administering a program, filling reports? A

relatively undemanding occupation, relatively free of competition? a kind of refuge into which a man can flee to pursue his whims and studies? a career where a man can be more his own boss, so far as time and pursuits go? (I am thinking here, as hereafter, in terms of the parish ministry, feeling that it is from this category of the ministry that the image is commonly viewed.)

II

The first impression one gets from examining mass media and the appraisals of social scientists is a common assumption that ministerial prestige has dropped. No one seems to have supported this assumption with conclusive evidence; it is rather taken for granted. The greater drawing power of other vocations is cited as a reason for the decline of qualified, high-caliber men for the ministry. Status rating is cited as reason for the dropout of theological students—not the status of the ministry per se, but in its comparison with other professions. The rise of the scientist and engineer, the appeal of business and industrial posts, could be more responsible for a lower prestige in the ministry than a lowering of standards or performance within the ministry itself. The medical profession laments the short supply of students for much the same reason—as though prestige were governed by supply and demand, with the number of applicants pounding on the door as the measure. If this be the criterion, the highest prestige would then be enjoyed by churches which have no serious scarcity, regardless of standards.

Certain instances come to mind, reflecting this common assumption of a decline in prestige. *Time*, reporting an article by a Jesuit on American funeral practices, laments the decline of Protestant ministerial influence in guiding and controlling funeral practices. With a sweep of the pen, he lays it to the lower status of the clergy.

A news report out of Australia indicates the low spot now given the clergy in seating protocol for state functions. Archbishops and bishops now come ninth, other clergy twenty-sixth, a step below members of Parliament. And the churches enter a protest on the declined status accorded the clergy.

A social scientist, tracing the development of the American Ex

eriment, spends considerable time with the Mathers of New England, with Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening, with the leadership of New England clergy in formulating the doctrines of political liberty, with the role of the clergy in the Abolitionist movement; but then in a single statement he dismisses the significance of the clergy since the Civil War—as though the assumption were well established that churches have reflected rather than affected social change on the American scene.

Max Lerner ties the declined status of the clergy with the declined role of the churches in shaping American life. Says he: "In most American communities church membership is a badge of social status, and membership in them represents safety in a conformist, church-going society. . . . It is less a question of what pastors say than the fact that they are no longer listened to; having lost the capacity for belief, they have lost the power to instill belief."¹ He then claims that the Protestant form of Christianity is not especially conducive to the dynamism and social optimism of the American scene. Its emphasis on sin and salvation scarcely supports the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. Lerner's analysis would thereby account for the popularity of a Norman Vincent Peale, but could scarcely allow for the influence of New England puritanism.)

Vance Packard would tie the status of the clergy with the status of the churches they represent. Prestige churches give ministers prestige status. Then he proceeds to indicate the variety of social classes and prestige represented in various communions, always hedging in the charts and polls with allowances for locale.

Margaret Mead has an implied image of the ministry when she speaks of churches as pools of social isolation—with the clergy compelled to conform, whether they want to or not.

A French sociologist, André Siegfried, registers his impressions of religion in mid-century America as follows: "Religion reflects American life, rather than indicates a spiritual force. Under these conditions many churches tend to become social clubs rather than places of worship, in which sports meetings for the young and Sunday suppers occupy an important place alongside the liturgy or the sermon. The pastor is

1 Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization* (New York, 1957), p. 711.

expected to be stimulating, a good mixer, and an efficient leader of his community, which he will have to defend against the competition of rival congregations. . . . When speaking as a popular leader, the pastor must display the qualities of a political candidate, but then he runs the risk of contracting a candidate's weakness."²

Perhaps the best appraisal is that of a Nebraska social scientist J. O. Hertzler. Writing twelve years ago of religious institutions in America, he says: "Religion in America, as elsewhere, is bound to reflect economic and political conditions, class structure, various cultures, historical situations like frontier life and the Civil War and urbanization, even social structure. . . . Organized religion tends to become overorganized. . . . The personnel, both professional and lay, drift into a more or less perfunctory and mechanical way of acting."³ Then he lists seven changes that have diminished the institutional sway of the church (involving by implication the diminished status of the clergy):

1. Voluntary participation and loss of enforcement power (thinking here of the disappearance of the established church on the American scene and the voluntary association that marks non-Roman church life)

2. The encroachment of science on the realm of the unknown and the supernatural, leaving religion with less than a monopoly in such spheres.

3. Divided loyalties and organizational support through a confusion of beliefs (where within a single congregation will be found all sorts of beliefs repudiated by the church itself; and where beliefs that run counter to the Christian faith are tolerated).

4. Only half the population affiliated with organized religion (Here one must demur if numbers alone are involved, since size would lead us to expect heightened status; one must infer here inferior quality, not fewer numbers or smaller percentage.)

5. Loss of many social services, especially in the field of social welfare, once regarded as the prerogative of the church.

6. Secularization of thought, and the accommodation of both laity and clergy to secular thought and ways.

2 André Siegfried, "America at Mid-Century," cited by Cecil Northcott in *The Christian Century*, September 11, 1957.

3 J. O. Hertzler, "Religious Institutions," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1948, pp. 12, 13.

7. The loss of the prophetic and reforming power of religion.

Summarizing these seven changes, Hertzler adds: "Organized religion has become a purely voluntary, semi-private affair; its jurisdiction, for better or worse, is divided, and its power to standardize behavior and exercise social control, either for individuals or for groups, as diminished as that of various other institutions has been augmented; its influence has evaporated from one department of life after another. . . . Some social scientists are even asking if religion can any longer be regarded as an institution of society."⁸

III

Of the changes listed here, two seem to deserve special consideration. One is the secularization of thought which has tended, on the one hand, to put spiritual concerns on the periphery of living, taking it out of the main stream, and, on the other hand, to set up secular standards for the church. The church, once colored by frontier life, once fighting its way to some kind of status, once given to crusades with the fervor of the dispossessed, gradually gained what it sought; but in gaining it, it tended to lose some of its spirit. In the latter half of the nineteenth century big business came into the church to stay—with successful businessmen in positions of influence, with the insistence on an educated ministry, with the camp meeting sermon giving way to the Chautauqua lecture. The church became more a corporation, using business standards, efficient methods, statistical measures as the criterion for success.

The institutional life of the modern church stamps the image of the ministry. From this vantage point, the minister is viewed as the key man in a corporation, the executive officer, the nerve center, the director. Modern business methods are his tool in trade, modern advertising schemes his promotional guide, modern devices for raising money his stewardship manual, the laws of Dale Carnegie his volume on personnel relations. He is accountable to a board of directors, and they in turn to stockholders. The chart of statistics registering growth of business or offering explanations to gloss over losses is the measure of his success.

One wonders if this is not what Hartzell Spence means when he speaks of the modern ministry getting away from "old ideas"? His

description is in terms of administration and personal counseling, rather than of personal call or sense of dedication to a lofty task. One feels that scientifically controlled instruments govern the techniques of this ministry, a proficiency developed by experience and schooling.

The emergence of specialized fields within the ministry has led men to a growing concern lest the ministry become too professional. Duties formerly laid upon one man have now been parceled out among executives, preachers, pastors, teachers, counselors—each with gifts and specialties distinctive of his field of service. While the sense of calling is still paramount in this image, it has become obscured by professional considerations. Robert Rankin, executive director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for theological education, cites this as a major concern of faculty men asked for reactions; he also concludes that the sense of vocation may be stronger among laymen in essentially secular occupations than among the clergy in professional fields. The same thing may be seen in the passion of younger men for techniques and skills in counseling, more than in the spirit and desire for pastoral ministry.

Moreover, the ministry as a profession is set in the midst of an expanding number of professions. It is less and less distinctive, competing with others on such matters as salary, security, fringe benefits, prestige. A few years ago *Life* had a two-page spread for June graduates, showing various qualifications and rewards of various occupations, with the ministry set in seeming competition with others. Salary scales appeared in contrast with other salary scales; fringe benefits by what others received; hours of work by the hours of a doctor or dentist or engineer; living conditions and occupational risks in similar contrast. Prestige rating for the clergy was considered an automatic thing, exceeded only by that of the medical profession in status, but distinct from the medics in that they had to earn their prestige. One wonders whether such a grouping of professions and setting of the ministry against the whole panorama renders any service—whether it does not encourage the seeking of returns rather than the sense of dedication. One wonders also whether the church's constant pressure to raise salary scales and other monetary returns has diminished the sense of dedication once expected and altered the image of the ministry.

A footnote should be added here, tying the prestige of the ministry

ith education. With the rise of public education, the mushrooming of ate universities, the separation of education from church control, the stinctiveness of a highly educated group was blurred. An estimate of ollege graduates prior to the Civil War shows that one-fourth of all graduates entered the ministry. Of 40,000 with bachelor's degrees, an estimated 10,000 had been trained for the ministry. Moreover, of 182 olleges and universities established up to that time, only 19 had been established by states—150 by Protestant churches and 13 by Roman atholics. Even before the days when the churches insisted on an edu- ated ministry, the clergy were looked to as the learned, the scholarly, e talented. The standards of ministerial education have never been gher and more uniform than today; but the rise of educational stand- ds in other fields and the broadening of the classification of profes- ons have affected the educational image of the ministry. The more ese have risen, the less distinctive has become the ministry as an ucated group.

Like many areas of life, the ministry has come under the scrutiny f surveys. One could resist this tendency to make of it a file-card ofession, subject to computers and electronic devices. One such study me out with the division of a minister's day, figuring the working day nine hours and fifty-seven minutes. Slightly less than half that time as devoted to matters of administration, about one-quarter to pastoral ork, about one-eighth to preaching, a like proportion to organization ad program, and the remaining whisker of time to teaching. In this ery division can be seen the rise of the institutional church and the ecessity of devoting inordinate blocks of time to administering a rporation.

Thus far we have dealt with the secularization of the church only a terms of the modern institution. It has provided an image of the inistry in terms of a corporation, injecting business standards and ficiency methods into the role of the ministry to a far greater extent an ever before. Perhaps, and to far greater degree, the influence of ecular thought has affected the image of the ministry in the diminished mportance given the role of the church and the ministry. While it is een as less and less significant for the major concerns of life, its ookesmen are more and more relegated to minor status. And the more intrudes its opinions and feelings into significant matters of politics

or economics or human relations, the more open it is to criticism. One does not feel the strong anticlericalism that at various periods has marked church history. Rare is the modern minister who qualifies for Ambrose Bierce's caustic definition of a clergyman, "a man who undertakes the management of our spiritual affairs as a method of bettering his temporal ones," or Elbert Hubbard's quip, "As a career, the business of an orthodox preacher is about as successful as that of a celluloid dog chasing an asbestos cat through Hell." If the image of the ministry has the color of a man overstepping his limits, it would be that of the Tory saying of his own minister, "I wish for the peace of America that he and others of his profession would confine themselves to gospel truths." The layman will gladly accord full authority on matters of worship, theology, biblical scholarship; but he grows somewhat wary when it comes to social and political issues. Here his image is of a man above the noise of strife, removed from the actual problem except by some mental extension; not having to face the criminal with some conscience about a stand on capital punishment; not having to make decisions of state with regard to immediate issues; not having to do business in a highly competitive society. The layman would have such issues met by involved laymen; he sets the clergy off in some other sphere where love and compassion and kindness can operate.

In this he reflects something of his forebears, coming from lands where clerical power had been suspect, establishing colonies where no bishop could be found prior to the Revolution, where free churches opposed preferred status for the clergy. It is not by accident that no single clergyman stands in the roll of American heroes (yes, one only, but he as an abolitionist, not as a clergyman). America has shown a temperamental distaste for any kind of clericalism. The suspicion of clerical power has been voiced in countless essays and asides, from George Washington on down. Witness the peptic comment of John Quincy Adams: "There is in the clergy of all denominations a time-serving, cringing, subservient morality, as wide from the spirit of the Gospel as it is from the intrepid assertion and vindication of truth." Or the remark of Samuel Johnson, asking why doctors and lawyers showed such indifference to religion: "While such men haven't given much thought to religion, they have all seen a parson." Any collection of quotations regarding the ministry or clergy is filled with caustic com-

ents, lampooning, caricature, aimed at pricking pompousness and self-righteousness, reflecting a suspicion of clerical power. Quite happily, such collections are culled from former days; and one does not find the same barb aimed at the ministry in our own day.

So much for the change wrought by secularization of thought and life. Now for a word about another change: the voluntary nature of the church of today. Here we strike the pressure of social conformity, admittedly as strong an image-maker as secular thought. No matter how high we regard the church as an institution or in its doctrinal sense, it remains a voluntary association of people so far as the public image is concerned. Dean Sperry writes that Americans look on the church primarily in terms of a four-walled building, that you can talk all you want about one, holy, catholic church; it either falls on deaf ears or else gives a hallowed ring to an otherwise mundane reality. The building incarnates the church, and mental associations of members are with others of their own voluntary group. Anyone caught in the difficulties of changing attitudes within a church knows how deeply this spirit pervades the lay mind.

Here and there clergy rise above this pressure—witness the stand taken in Scarsdale or that of Martin Luther King. And the laymen will expect something of a prophetic note from the pulpit, so long as it is not taken too seriously in practice. One expects a reminder of ideals, inspirations, of the truth even when no intention to apply to performance is involved.

Is this a strong image of the ministry today—a profession subject to social pressure and conforming to social practice? And is it at this point that well-qualified young men draw the line, drawing a distinction between the study of theology and the call to a ministry circumscribed by such limitations? A few years ago a young Methodist clergyman wrote an article for *Harper's Magazine* voicing these very feelings as his reasons for demitting the ministry. The stifling pressure of social conformity topped the list of reasons and could be found in concomitant reasons—such as compromising his convictions, diluting his message, facing him with people resistant to change. His article was met with a barrage of replies from veterans of the cloth, in effect asking when a prophet depended on a mandate from his people.

IV

Now to turn from appraisals of students of the American scene and a few of their implications to a brief consideration of the image as seen in mass media, chiefly the motion pictures, the public press, and current literature.

The 1930 code adopted by movie producers has this statement: "Ministers of religion in their character as ministers of religion should not be used as comic characters or villains." The intent of such a provision is quite clear; yet in hewing to the line, the general image of the ministry is weak and insipid, avoiding the pitfalls suggested here, but in rare cases presenting the clergy as strong characters (even in those rare cases, one feels that the whole profession is not involved—merely a vivid personality). The contrast between ministers of the Gospel and Roman Catholic priests is marked. Where can a Protestant counterpart be found for the role of the priest in, say, "The Bells of St. Mary's"? And could we imagine a priest cast in the role of an Elmer Gantry, be he atypical or not? The priest is shown with a resourcefulness to meet every situation with aplomb, a compassion for the underprivileged, an identification with people on their own level, a man's man, mingling with the sordid without being tainted, always coming out on top. Not so among Protestant ministers. One feels here a highly-romanticized image, ethereal, drained of red blood, giving the impression of always doing the right thing but being quite conscious of it. Somehow he is tragically unreal—at least in this person's book. The result is a caricature bordering on the comic, where virtues become repulsive, and the whole taste is insipid. One wonders if the producer merely imagines what the ministry should be, or if he is walking so warily for fear of giving offense as to drain his men of character. Where, among pictures produced commercially, can one find a counterpart for De Lawd of "Green Pastures"? And one asks even of films produced under church auspices whether the same charge would not be in part true—of an unreal, sentimental image that would leave young men cold. Perhaps the problem is essentially the same as that faced in *Faust*, where Faust himself should be the hero with most appeal, only to play second fiddle to Mephistopheles in characterization. One is far more drawn to the latter than to the former.

The image in the public press seems to be far more favorable, at least at the moment. Here the impact of the ministry for shaping and enforcing public opinion is recognized; and the press likewise senses the religious interests of its reading public. The *New York Times*, for example, can give front-page space to religious news items. The position of clergymen can receive treatment on the stock market page, in their support of the Endicott Johnson stock battle. While the press is more enamored of human interest stories than of broad trends, and can give ample space to such personalities as Billy Graham or Martin Luther King, without making them typical of the clergy, one need only compare the space given today with that of twenty-five years ago to see the increased significance of religious news.

The image in the public press is of an educated, concerned, and informed group that carries no little weight in the shaping of grassroots attitudes and opinions. And when the press is involved in a crusade for better conditions, for resolving social problems, it finds a hundred spirit in the work of the clergy.

While thinking of the press, one must cite two areas in which the image of the clergy appears frequently. One is, of all places, in columns for advising the lovelorn—the “Ann Landers” or “Dear Abby” types. At times I would want to write these experts a note asking that they lay off their referral of cases to the clergy for a time. One letter in particular typified this, where a woman addressed Ann Landers asking what to do about a no-good husband who spent his paycheck at the nearest taproom, came home drunk, persisted in smoking vile cigars, never kept his shoes on at home, and could be summed up with one word, “Slob.” The answer of Ann consisted of just three words: See your clergyman. Here is one reason why young adult work languishes in congregations, attracting a collection of spouse-seekers and social misfits who seek companionship in some kind of group therapy. The image of the ministry portrays the wise counselor, the understanding third party, the listening ear, the peacemaker and upholder of morality. The clergyman is invariably portrayed here as Friend, not as Judge.

The other area lies in cartoons, both in the public press and periodical literature. The liturgical movement in Protestantism could be traced here by examining the dress of the clergy. Where formerly he wore the cutaway or morning coat and wing collar, he is now com-

monly collared and, in post-worship scenes, adorned in full vestments. His very presence sets the incongruity of the cartoon, the unseemly word, the deviltry, the social error the more embarrassing for his presence. If in homes, he is commonly engaged in sipping tea, seldom crosses his legs, is surrounded by ladies of an older vintage, is usually bald, somewhat portly and sleek, much at home in the niceties of social life. The image, while respectful, bears something of a caricature: a man of exemplary character, above all when it comes to temptations and outbursts of feeling and earthy situations. While he himself is not embarrassed by what he sees or hears, his audience is. They want him to think well of them, put on their best front in his presence, and in the end act a bit unreal themselves.

Current literature bears much the same image as that found in motion pictures. Rare are fictionalized portraits that see the clergyman as a man's man, coming to grips with great issues in the crucible of living, living in the rough-and-tough areas of life. A familiar stock in trade is the young cleric with strong ideals getting into trouble with the vested layman who controls the purse strings and policies of the church; and, while he usually comes out on top, the plot seems a bit loaded from the start. One longs for a strong portrait such as that of the bishop in *Les Misérables*. It is easier to write an Elmer Gantry, though Elmer has affected the popular image of the clergy much less than such a devastating portrait might seem to forebode. The overall image is again that of a relatively weak character, remote from the jungle of living, immune to the sordid, having no eyes for evil, overly strong on the virtuous.

All in all, the image in mass media is rather neutral, something of a scoreless tie when it comes to character, so conscious of what to avoid as to effect a weak impression. Here and there it is an appealing image, as when the clergy stand firm against insuperable odds, or where men of the cloth show the courage of firm convictions, or where individual clergymen are portrayed in glowing terms. And in some quarters he has the image of a wonder-worker—talking a neurotic out of jumping off a ledge, purging the ways of an alcoholic, straightening out a domestic problem of long standing in a half-hour conference, changing lives that have grown bent for decades. His facility in interpersonal relationships seems to be assumed. But one still wonders how much of

the image reflected in mass media would lure a strong man into the ranks.

V

Now for a few broad conclusions. First should be the image that seems to go without saying. In spite of an apparent move toward professionalism, people still look to the clergy as men of God, dedicated to their tasks, specialists from personal experience in the things of the spirit. Regardless of the factors that may have lowered their prestige rating, this image has not been seriously altered. The clergyman is still the keeper of the keys of morality, the comforter of the bereaved, friend of lonely and sick, the ear open to trouble, the pocket open to the wayfarer. The man on the street still sees him as the embodiment of compassion and the softer virtues.

From this image comes his automatic prestige in the community. Civic organizations recognize his influence within community life. Along with the family doctor, he has access to the deepest recesses of community life. In many respects he is placed on a pedestal he does not merit, and because of that pedestal he is viewed as having no eye for evil, no temptation of the flesh, no thoughts but of purity, no practices out of prayer and meditation. He is removed from the seamy sides of life, not because he stands in judgment upon them or speaks a language foreign to them, but because he has eyes for what is unseen and eternal.

We are heirs of this image, coming in some kind of apostolic succession from those who have gone before: leader in the community, informed, well trained, having a range of interests running the gamut of human experience, chartered by the ministry described in the Gospels for all to read. To millions this is the chief image of the ministry, a portrait of men whose devotion and direction and way of life reflect a humble attempt to walk with Christ—to millions, intermediaries on the Way. Built as it is on personal relationships and the signal events of life, it will always defy analysis. Objective appraisals become as impossible as those within a family. Regardless of statements by social scientists and the image in mass media, this image is as bright and strong today as ever; and, from my point of view, this image is still unmatched in its appeal to young men to enter the ministry. If Hartzell

Spence has it in mind when he speaks about "old ideas" being superseded, someone needs to revitalize it—not by contrived means, but merely to let it shine forth as it truly exists.

Second, if there have been notable changes, the most significant may well lie in the expanded duties of the minister today. Up until last year, I was serving under a charter that defined the work of the pastor in terms of 1808. He was expected to preach and conduct services, visit the sick, conduct funerals and other pastoral acts, teach a confirmation class, and that was it. The balance of his time would be given to spiritual exercises, especially study. If you compare such duties with those of today (and the ratio of hours reported from the survey above), you see how such duties are over-shadowed by the demands of organization, evangelism, community activities, and the like. Here is where parish ministry becomes distasteful, and the point at which the Rockefeller Fund should give serious attention. In trying to expose uncommitted men to the image and call of the ministry, it finds more of these men lured by the study of theology but having no interest in a parish ministry. They tend to look upon the latter as the running of a business enterprise, requiring diplomacy and public relations, setting up activities and programs of doubtful merit. Such an image is far removed from meeting the burning issues of a sick world.

For several years I served on a committee to interview pre-theological students in college and seminary, and this distinction between a parish ministry and a specialized ministry came more and more to the fore. The outstanding men in the group, with few exceptions, saw something quite beyond and apart from the congregation as their goal—in some instances the ministry of teaching, in many the ministry on college and university campuses. Their image had in large measure been formed by the church they knew at home, the pedestrian educational system of their churches, and more particularly the seemingly wooden way in which a pastor's life was enmeshed in a mass of meaningless detail. Nor were they idealists bent on saving the world at the highest echelons, while ignoring the Lazaruses at the doorstep. It lies more in the confining nature of a group to which and for which they are responsible—a group reflecting social structure, various backgrounds, and knowing every stage of spiritual maturity. And herein they foresee the pressures to conform, the necessity for moving slowly

the circumscribing hand of majority votes, the heavy weight of tradition, the virtual autonomy of a voluntary association of people.

If the ministry be regarded as a profession of therapy, here is a point at which it becomes unique. The medical man deals with patients one by one, with no group responsibility involved. Likewise the lawyer and, to a degree, the teacher. But both individual and group therapy fall to the lot of the minister. Group implications affect his personal ministry—a fact that brings both frustration and excitement to his office: frustration with the slow response and the necessity for time-consuming matters of organization; excitement, realizing that his leadership can weld a sense of community, much as a coach with raw material or the head of a family in a home.

And for a final conclusion. It is not the prestige rating of the ministry that causes concern today—let that fluctuate as it will—but rather the draining of real character and strength in the public image. I am not so sure that the best qualified young men are not the most devilish. Since they have to wrestle with the Old Boy constantly, it is not so bad that they get to know him rather early. At least it would be within this area that I would seek out young men most—not among those of timid, somewhat effeminate nature, regarded as models of young manhood. The feminine emphasis in our churches has had its effect here, where religion is thought of as primarily suited to the listaff side, where young people note the preponderance of ladies in worship, in teaching posts, and in other positions of contact with them. In this setting many a person forms his image of the ministry—as dealing with an area of primary concern to women, and as finding the impetus for the ministry in the challenge of a woman teacher. One wonders whether this has not in large measure colored the image found in such mass media as motion pictures and current literature. The glib tongue and the clean hand become two cardinal qualifications for such a ministry—not the sympathetic ear or the courage to stand for convictions or the facility in meeting people of all kinds. No more pointedly is this image reflected than in the soothing words of a parishioner, "You can't please everyone, can you?" As if that were the goal of the ministry, or even a minor objective!

Years of observation have not allowed for an appraisal of the image of the ministry over a long span of time. Whether more favor-

able today than a half century ago I could not say. From what little I have read, I strongly suspect that the ministry has not been better trained, better informed, better qualified for its task. In its sense of dedication and the depth of its spiritual life, I am not so sure. But I do know enough of the ministry to feel that the image of strength and virility is there, if only it could be seen as it is. We need no public relations expert to manufacture an image with contrived devices. But perhaps we do need such an expert to bring out what is already there.

Liberating Truth and Liberal Education

BY ROBERT W. JENSON

YOU see why some studies are called liberal; it is because they are worthy of a free man. Indeed, there is only one truly liberal study, that which liberates."¹ "Then Jesus said to the Jews who had believed in him, 'If you continue in my word . . . you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free.'"²

Even at first sight, the convergence and the divergence of these proclamations are equally plain. The convergence of the traditions here represented has been the basis of Western culture and particularly of Western education; the divergence has been the continuing crisis. The relation between these two conceptions of liberating knowledge is therefore no purely speculative question—surely not for ecclesiastical bodies which maintain institutions of "liberal education."

I

The Roman philosopher Seneca represents here the entire classical tradition of education—there are certain arts which are the proper study of a free man in that they fit him for his freedom. There has never been perfect agreement as to what these arts might be; in the passage above Seneca is in fact engaged in polemic against the traditional list. But the concept remains the same, and it is with this that we shall concern ourselves. We shall investigate the concept of the "liberal arts, quite proper for a free man to acquire. . . ."³

We ask: Who is this "free man"? He is, first, the one who is capable of rule.⁴ There is for the classical tradition a natural difference between the man born to freedom and the man born to servitude; they

1 Quare liberalia studia dicta sint, vides; quia homine libero digna sunt. Ceterum unum studium vere liberale est, quod liberum facit. Seneca, *Epistolae morales*, LXXXVIII, 2.

2 John 8:31 f.

3 Aristotle, *Politika*, VIII, 2. 1337b.

4 The following discussion is based on Aristotle's *Politika*. Further citation will generally be avoided.

constitute very nearly two species of mankind. The man born to rule is the one who is capable of discovering general principles of social ethics and of deducing the necessary consequences in each case of decision; he is possessed of "practical reason." The natural slave, on the other hand, can appreciate such consequences when they are explained to him, but cannot himself derive them. The liberal arts are those studies which conduce to this virtue, which train practical reason.

The "free man" is, second, the man freed from preoccupation with the immediate needs of existence. This is simply the negative side of the definition above. A mode of life centered in preparing and procuring the necessities of life is disastrous to the life of freedom, a hindrance to the man who rules by reason and who, when he obeys, obeys by reason. The arts involved in such a life distract from, and finally render unfit for, the life of intellect.

From this point of view, the liberal arts are therefore the *useless* arts, the arts which have no purpose exterior to the life of reason, which are valuable for their own sake. Aristotle suggests as an example the art of drawing—if it is not practiced as a profession. When practiced by the dilettante it makes one a judge of the beauty of the human form, thus promotes practical reason in a particular area, and so is liberal.

The "free man" is, third, the man in whom the true concept of humanity comes to fruition. Both previous determinations are based on a particular anthropology. Man has basically three modes of existence: nutritive, sensitive, and rational. He possesses and preserves physical life, reacts to stimuli, *and* can transcend both of these modes by directing them in accord with general principles. The three therefore form a hierarchy; man is truly man when his nutritive and sensitive life is rigorously subject to reason. The free man is just this ruler over the irrational factors of his own existence, the man in whom the development to *humanity* has not been stunted.

And the liberal arts? They are those which train man toward his natural goal, the life of reason. The free life is the life of intellect, and, note well, the life of intellectual activity pursued *for its own sake*. We would misunderstand the classical tradition if we supposed that it made the welfare of society in itself the goal and valued the liberal arts *because* they train the rulers so needed by society. The free man is indeed

the ruler in society, but properly to understand this phrase we must begin with "ruler," not with "society." The free man's political freedom is the reflex of his freedom in himself, of the freedom of one who rises above the limiting and determining physical and psychological factors of existence by subjecting them to thought. In the last analysis only purely intellectual activity is perfectly free activity. It is to this that the liberal arts are directed. "It is clear that there are branches of learning and education which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business exist for the sake of other things."⁵

For this tradition, the true knowledge which frees is the truth of *thought*, the inner transcendence of the human mind over all bondage.

II

Very apparently, John says something radically different. Here the "truth" is Jesus of Nazareth, a *person*. It is not a semantic predicate of certain general propositions, not a character of my thinking. Truth is God's speech to me, his address, his "Hey you!" by which he breaks open my self-contained existence and relates it to something outside itself. It is precisely this existence in which I seek to establish my own goal and justification for life which is the "lie" overcome by the "truth." That is, something painfully reminiscent of the classical "free lie in the truth" is here exactly the lie to be abolished. Not my self-rule but God's intrusion, his startling "Hold it!" is the truth.

"True" has here the sense of "a true die" or "a true circle." It is most equivalent to "real." *God* is real, and what he wills. The truth is God-revealing-himself, God-present-to-me, *deus loquens*. Truth, that *occurs*. It occurs when God interrupts my flight from him and places himself in my way as the unavoidably decisive pole of my life. Truth is Jesus.

And what is the freedom granted by *this* "liberal art"? It is freedom from the necessity to provide my own justification for living, freedom from the vicious circle of a life condemned to rotate about itself,

⁵ Aristotle, *Politika*, VIII, 2, 1337b.

freedom from chasing my tail and from the total futility involved. It is clear that this is the opposite pole from the "freedom" of the classical tradition. We can go right down the line and show this:

Christian freedom is freedom not to rule, but to serve. It is precisely freedom from preoccupation with my own status before man or God, freedom to descend to where I am needed. The classical conception of freedom is irrevocably aristocratic, it is the freedom of lords and masters. We forget that "free and democratic" Athens rested upon the shoulders of slaves who had no voice at all. Christianity spread exactly as the religion of those slaves.

Christian freedom is freedom for my vocation, whatever that may be. If it be to rule the state, well and good. If it be to make shoes, to write books, or to dig holes, again well and good.

Christian freedom is not the natural self-development of the potentialities within *me*, but the gift of God. It is not the fruition which I will attain if only I am left alone, but that which is the opposite of what I can attain. A whole different anthropology is involved. Man, for the biblical tradition, is not a self-contained "nature," not an entity with certain inherent potentialities who is truly human to the degree that these potentialities develop. Rather, he is exactly that being destined to be broken open by God's address, destined to be called away from self-cultivation and made to transcend himself, *all* of himself. Man is man in that he is spoken to by God.

III

What then of the synthesis which upholds Western education? What, in particular, of "Christian liberal arts"? Must we in loyalty to biblical liberating knowledge reject the classic tradition whole? Must we acquiesce in the split into universities without theology and church institutions which, whatever their title, cultivate nothing that Seneca would have recognized as liberal arts? Must we say that it has finally come to light that Athens and Jerusalem are quite simply opposed?

Or should we take a less drastic position and view education into human wisdom as dangerous but necessary? There is no doubt but that this is the most usual justification for the existence of church colleges. We are to maintain the liberal arts, but under clerical control, so that

can be sure that they are not taken quite seriously and can select certain things from which the students are not to be liberated.

If your choice were limited to these two alternatives, the first would certainly be preferable. It is more honest. But these are not the alternatives. We have examined the divergence between the classical and biblical traditions of liberating knowledge. But the fact remains that the convergence is just as obvious as the divergence. After all, John, writing in the same language as Aristotle, spoke of "knowing" and of "freedom." If there were *no* point of meeting (I do not say "point of connection"), if Greek freedom were utterly alien to Christian freedom, John would have been making non-sentences, talking in riddles.

If we look back over the contrast between the Greek and New Testament views, we can sum up the biblical objection to the Greek freedom-in-the-truth in one point. For the Greeks, man's culture, his self-cultivation, his own liberating knowledge, is saddled with the task of providing the final basis and reason of life. The Greeks were the first and greatest humanists—and if we understand our own message we will *not* make this the charge against them. Rather we shall object that their humanism is not able to remain *human*, but is burdened with the impossible and unsuitable job of doing *God's* work as well.

Where the Gospel is proclaimed, man and his knowledge are freed from this hopeless task. Where the Gospel is proclaimed, that cultivation of the human creature which the Greeks discovered is freed from the need to be more than *human* cultivation of *humanity*. And then precisely the Christian can and must affirm it wholeheartedly.

For what, in *this* situation, do the liberal arts become? What *then* do they do for us?

They free us from narrowness of life. Here I can do no better than steal phrases from Joseph Sittler: they "complicate us open," force us to "join the human race." Each of us walls himself off behind the walls of his own particular background and experiences. We separate ourselves as Norwegians or Germans, as Lutherans, Methodists, or (tolerant and enlightened as we are) Christians, as Mid-Westerners or Easterners, as respectable and open-minded and religious. We find our justification in these distinctions and look tolerantly upon the publicans and sinners outside. We operate with simple distinctions and black and

white ethics—and hover in glorified abstraction over the complicated dirt of human existence.

Here the liberal arts can do just what the classical tradition promises. They lead away from this narrow existence. They push us into wide and dangerous spaces where life ceases to be simple and becomes the problem which for suffering mankind it in fact is. They tear us from life lived according to memorized maxims (the life of Aristotle's "slave"), responding only to immediate needs (the life of the "mechanic"). One chief purpose of college is indeed to get away from home.

The freedom thus granted is not the final freedom of grace. Indeed, theologically considered this freedom to join the human race is but freedom to participate in man's *bondage*. But is not the law by which God drives us from our self-chosen isolation as presumptive gods "holy and good"? Is it not precisely to man's prison that Christ comes to set us free?

We must further consider that salvation comes indeed from God and not from man—but that it is man whom God saves. He has created us men, he has saved us to be men, and he calls us to serve our fellow men. Now, no race has cultivated humanity like the Greeks. The knowledge of what it means to be a man which the classical tradition cherishes, the arts of the cultivation of humanity, are *not* to be despised by those set free by God to be human creatures and to serve human creatures. To seize a few points at random:

Not only Aristotle, but Genesis teaches that man is made to rule and that his humanity consists therein. Also in Genesis man is given "practical reason" as the means for this task.⁶ The biblical proclamation cleanses this rule of its self-centeredness—and thus makes it precisely the purely and truly human task which the classical conception longs to be.

Not only the classical tradition, but also the biblical proclamation makes "useless" work, work without ulterior motives, *play*, central to humanity. Surely the believer, who believes and gives thanks that God does all, should be free from the deadly ethics of the useful. Or what then is worship?

6 Genesis 2:19.

Man, we said, is created to hear the Word of God. It is no accident that the Greek uses the same word for "word" and for "reason." We are created to hear God's Word—we are created able to hear words. And it is precisely this openness to words which is reason. We, who are from God's Word, who are called to hear also the words of our brothers and to speak God's words to them, we above all should rejoice in reason and thank God for the arts by which we may cultivate it. God does not infiltrate us physically, he does not rule us by conditioned reflexes, he speaks. And so even the classical hierarchy reveals itself as a reflection of God's way of working.

One final word. I do not mean by all this that the liberal arts and the proclamation of the Gospel can, in spite of all difficulties, be brought together." Where this is attempted, it is always done by mixing one or both. The Gospel becomes religious insights and ethical atmosphere; the liberal arts are issued in a censored version. Rather than mean that they are never apart at all—and too far apart ever to be brought together. I mean that the wisdom of man belongs to God's great "No" by which God drives me—to Christ. And that God's Gospel is his permission—to be a man.

Christian Love and Public Policy in Luther

BY CONRAD BERGENDOFF

LUTHER was no politician. "As a preacher," he wrote, "and a messenger of Christ I have nothing to teach you concerning economy, agriculture, matrimony, industry, and the like." "I will not give directions how it [the government] shall conduct itself in all things. I will let that be left to reason, but I will say how in its actions love toward neighbor must be exhibited. What can I say to the tailor in teaching him about the sewing of a coat? He knows that beforehand. Only this can I tell him, to do his handiwork in a good and Christian manner. Likewise it does not become me to instruct a ruler. I will but tell him to act as a Christian. The rulers and the temporal authority should hold and wield the sword altogether in a Christian way while serving, protecting, and governing. The temporal rule is a very extensive power, and I but direct that love be the object in its exercise."

But in an age when the church embraced the state, something was bound to happen when the current conception of the church was challenged, as Luther challenged it after 1520. In the popular mind the church was synonymous with the hierarchy centered in Rome, whose bishop was the vicar of Christ on earth, and Christendom was the body of baptized adherents throughout the dioceses of the Roman hierarchy. To Luther this external organization was not at all synonymous with the church of Christ. The church had priests, but its priesthood was founded on the spiritual gifts in Baptism and expresses itself in service. The work of the priest is only one of many offices in Christendom. The ruler, too, is a "fellow-member of the Christian body" and not subordinate to spiritual servants.

At first Luther hoped that the reforms he urged would purify the ecclesiastical system without destroying the political system. He wanted the church to reform itself. When this proved a vain hope, Luther turned to the princes, not to reform the church but to do their own duty.

1 *WA*, LII, 268.

2 *WA*, X, 3, 380, 6 (*Predigten des Jahres 1522*).

that reforms might be effected by the leaders of the church who wanted improvements. The rulers were ordained to preserve peace and justice, to punish wrong, to prohibit blasphemy. They were to fulfill their office even if it meant the correction of the "pope, bishops, priests, monks, nuns, or anybody else." In an emergency, as members of the Christian community, they might call a church council for the reform of abuses.³

Luther's attention soon became absorbed in the rebuilding of the aggregations, and his interest in imperial or German politics was limited to the bearing these had on the freedom of churches to reform themselves. Ever before him was the vision of the true church, which is "the natural, essential, real and true one, . . . a spiritual, inner Christendom. The other, which is man-made and external, let us call worldly, external Christendom: not as if we would part them asunder, but just as when I speak of a man, and call him, according to the soul, spiritual, according to the body, a physical man; or as the Apostle is wont to speak of the inner and of the outward man. Thus also the Christian assembly, according to the soul, is a communion of one accord and one faith, although according to the body it cannot be assembled at the same place, and yet every group is assembled in its own place."⁴ But how is this "inner" and "outward" Christendom to be related to the secular order, or even to the respective groups among themselves when they are not in one place? Here were real problems.

Clear in his own mind that the subordination of the government to the papal church was a false relationship, Luther at first was perplexed by men and movements that carried his own views of the church further than he could countenance. "Anabaptism" is the name usually given to the whole "left wing" of the Reformation which Luther found he had to repudiate. But modern scholarship⁵ has come to distinguish between three groups within the early amorphous complex of "radical reformers," and it is well to keep this distinction in mind, for even today there are groupings in Protestantism that parallel the divisions of the sixteenth century. The center around which the "free churches" gradually developed was composed of the Swiss Brethren, the South

Works of Martin Luther, Philadelphia edition.

Ibid., I, 355 (The Papacy at Rome, 1520).

Cf. Franklin H. Littell, *The Anabaptist View of the Church*.

German Brethren, the Hutterites, and the Dutch Mennonites. Peripheral to these was, on the one hand, the "Spiritualizers," represented by Franck and Schwenckfeld, who believed in no "outer" church organization whatever, and on the other, by the "Revolutionaries" who under Thomas Müntzer sought to set up the heavenly kingdom on earth and afterwards continued a chiliastic preaching through Melchior Hoffman and Hans Hut. It is correct to say that Luther opposed "Anabaptism," but it was not clear at first to Luther himself how various and variegated were the groups indicated by the name. To the "Spiritualizers" and the "Revolutionaries" he was clearly opposed because they confused the "outer" and the "inner" church. His ground of opposition to the Brethren was different. They wanted an outer organization, as did Luther, but entirely on a voluntary basis. They charged Luther with half-way measures, with compromise because he held to the old parish system and negotiated with the princes and other secular authorities in order to maintain something of the old order. The distinction is noteworthy also because in time the followers of Luther, on another continent, our own, had to find themselves in an order unlike that of Germany, with the result that the voluntary principle of the "free churches" was adopted by Lutherans in America.

It was in the controversy with the Roman Church on the one hand and with Anabaptist groups on the other that Luther found his way to an answer concerning the relation of "inner" and "outer" Christendom to the secular order. As opposed to Rome's contention that every congregation must be subordinate to its bishops and decrees, Luther held that wherever Christians came together to hear the preaching of the Word and to receive the sacraments as instituted by the Lord, a congregation existed and could, in emergency, ordain its own minister. However, he preferred that the parish system should continue, under reformed bishops, and hoped that the preaching of the Word would revitalize the congregations from within. There were not enough people, he claimed, to form "pure" congregations.

In fact, however, the bishops resisted reform, and Luther found it necessary to call on princes and city councils to organize congregations. The ruler was a member of the Christian community, and by virtue of his vocation to keep peace and order in his realm he had the right, in this emergency, to keep the churches in repair, help place the

gy in parishes, keep out trouble-makers, and forbid blasphemy, including the Roman Mass. In the "Visitation Articles" we catch a glimpse of the almost insuperable obstacles confronting the Reformers, but with the assistance given by the rulers a new parish system was founded, and in time a strong and rich congregational life developed. It must be admitted that the rulers used their "emergency rights" to their own advantage, especially in the spoliation of the material goods of the medieval church. But it may be questioned if the booty of the princes was any greater than that divided between ecclesiastical and secular rulers under the Roman system, and it must be stressed that only the emergency led Luther to ask for this temporal assistance. And for all that the important thing was the life of the congregation.

The church, he believed, had its unique mission in the world, different from that of the government. The tools and treasures of the church were the Word and the sacraments; the government was entrusted with the sword. The church was instituted to bring men into the kingdom of God; the government was ordained to preserve peace and order among its people. The church proclaimed the Gospel; the government depended on the law.

The distinction between law and Gospel in Luther is of fundamental importance. But it is not a distinction that can be extended beyond its context in the Word. It is altogether wrong to say that the church is the kingdom of God and that the world in which the law operates is the kingdom of the devil. Nor is it correct to say that the Gospel has to do with the spirit and that the law belongs to the flesh. If all of these terms are ambiguous, and hopeless confusion results if the distinction between law and Gospel is not interpreted evangelically.

The Word of God contains both law and Gospel, and the church is set to proclaim the whole Word, including the law. The believer who is justified by his faith in the Gospel is not thereby removed from the jurisdiction of the law. By his faith in Christ he is saved from the condemnation and curse of the law, but not from its injunctions. At the same time as he is saved by faith, he is adjudged a sinner by his failure to fulfill the law. The law, however, remains good, and it is a gift of God.

It is the business of government to proclaim and execute the law among its subjects, who, without it, would destroy themselves and all

order. "The world and the masses are and will be unchristian, although they are all baptized and are nominally Christian. Christians, however, are few and far between, as the saying is. Therefore, it is out of the question that there should be a common Christian government over the whole world, nay, even over one land or company of people, since the wicked always outnumber the good. Hence a man who would venture to govern an entire country or the world with the Gospel would be like a shepherd who would place in one fold wolves, lions, eagles, and sheep together and let them freely mingle with one another and say, Help yourselves and be good and peaceful among yourselves; the fold is open there is plenty of food; have no fear of dogs and clubs. The sheep, forsooth, would keep the peace and would allow themselves to be fed and governed in peace, but they would not live long; nor would any beast keep from molesting another."⁶ "If there were no worldly government, no man could live because of other men; one would devour the other, as the brute beasts do. Therefore it is the function and the honor of worldly government to make men out of wild beasts and to prevent men from becoming wild beasts."⁷

The law must be accepted even apart from faith. Luther seems to hold that natural law is the same as the Decalog and is revealed in creation itself. "God himself has ordained this divine state and order of things, so that there might be stability, peace, and order in the world and that justice might be preserved. It is therefore rightly called a 'righteousness of God,' which endures always and concerns each one. The jurists call this natural law. For if God himself had not ordained this state of things, and did not daily uphold it as his work, not a spark of justice would endure a moment."⁸ The law is the will of the creator, and all social life is dependent on it. There has been a revelation of the law in the Old Testament apart from the revelation of grace in Jesus Christ, so law and Gospel are not necessarily combined. Yet the fullness of the law and its righteousness are apparent to the mind which has been illuminated by the revelation of the glory of Christ in a way they never are seen by the "natural man," who knows only the compulsive aspect of the law. Hence the believer is sensitive to

6 *WML*, III, 237 (Secular Authority, 1523).

7 *Ibid.*, IV, 159 (On Keeping Children In School, 1530).

8 *WA*, XXI, I, 409, 34 (*Der III. Psalm ausgelegt*, 1530).

sin, which is transgression of law, while the unbeliever hardly knows the meaning of sin. "All will confess that in Christ they have experienced the greatest joy and the greatest sorrow at one and the same time, the greatest power and the greatest weakness, the greatest glory and the greatest confusion, the greatest peace and the greatest turmoil, the greatest life and the greatest death."⁹ Similarly, the fulfillment of the law is conceived of very differently by the Christian and by the man who merely keeps the law.

The government is as much an instrument of God as is the church. For the fulfillment of its task it depends on human reason, by which man can understand and apply the law as it is known in creation and in the wisdom of human nature. "All men have by nature this universal knowledge—namely, that God is, that he has created heaven and earth, that he is just, that he punishes the impious, etc."¹⁰ It cannot wait for willing acceptance but imposes its demands on all and is permitted to use force to obtain compliance. "For without the sword the law is ineffective and merely the cause of increasing crimes. On the other hand, the sword without the law is tyranny and brutal cruelty. But when each is joined to the other, that is, when law and sword are together, then political order is attractive and stable."¹¹ Justice and righteousness are civil qualities which government strives to maintain, and it calls forth all the best in human nature to reach the dictates of the law. Order, peace, social welfare are all within the province of the law, and it is God's will that they be proclaimed by church and school and administered by officials of man's own choosing, according to his reason.

Farther than that government cannot go, but even this is a work of God, albeit the work of his "left hand" and less marvelous than the "proper" work of his Spirit, which is the creation of a new man and a new society through Jesus Christ. The church can share with the government the task of the proclamation of the law, and it is happy when secular authorities cooperate to the extent of allowing the church to perform its peculiar task, the proclamation of the Gospel, which can be done only through Word and sacrament. The church may admonish and teach the government what is the will of God, but it may not usurp

9 *WA*, V, 602, 21 (*Operationes in Psalmos*, 1519-21).

10 *WA*, XL, I, 607, 19 (*In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius*, 1535).

11 *WA*, XIV, 665, 7 (*Deuteronomium Mosi cum Annotationibus*, 1525).

the government's prerogative to rule and to use force. And even in the realm of the law members of the church have no higher wisdom than that of reason; they cannot invoke any special revelation as to measures of law enforcement. "God has permitted secular government to be established among this people [Israel] without special commandment from heaven, allowing people also to use their natural reason in its ordering. For it is for this that he has given men reason and five senses."¹² Nor may the government deny to the church its mission to proclaim the Gospel. Since the Christian is more sensitive than the non-Christian to the demands of the law, he should be foremost among the supporters of government when it seeks justice. "But in reply to their objection that Christians are not commanded to fight and that examples are not enough, because they have a teaching from Christ that they are not to resist evil, but suffer all things—in reply to this I have made sufficient answer in my book *On Temporal Authority*. For Christians, indeed, do not fight and have no worldly rulers among them [i.e. themselves]. Their government is a spiritual government, and according to the Spirit, they are subjects of no one but Christ. Nevertheless, as far as body and property are concerned, they are subject to worldly rulers and owe them obedience. If worldly rulers call on them to fight, then they ought to and must fight, and be obedient, not as Christians but as members of the state and obedient subjects as regards the body and temporal possessions. Therefore, when they fight they do it not for themselves or on their own account, but as a service and act of obedience to the rulers under whom they are, as St. Paul writes to Titus, 'They shall obey the rulers.'"¹³ If government should itself be unjust, and especially if it blasphemes God, the Christian shall endure as long as possible, but the point may be reached when he must obey God rather than man.

Luther's primary interest was not in the secular government but in the church. He was convinced that the medieval church had lost its central function, that of proclaiming the Gospel whereby men receive forgiveness of sins and are declared righteous before God. It had trespassed in the domain of secular government and usurped some of its functions. "The pope has done wrong in that he has wanted to compel and drive the people by laws. For among Christian people there

12 WA, XVI, 356 (*Predigten über das 2. Buch Mose*, 1524-27).

13 WML, V, 38-39 (*Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved*, 1526).

either should nor could be an exercise of force. If one attempts to bind the conscience by external injunctions, faith and Christian character soon disappear. For Christians must be led and ruled altogether by the Spirit, in such a way that they know that already they have by faith everything whereby they are saved, needing nothing else. Henceforth, they need do nothing more than serve their neighbor and use all they have in assisting him, as Christ has ministered to them. Thus they do all their works freely and willingly, out of happy and joyful hearts, thanking, praising, and honoring God for the good things received from him."¹⁴ The papal church had confused a righteousness of works with a righteousness of faith. All that the church could demand of the secular power was its recognition of being under God, and of its responsibility to the divine law for its conduct. This implied a secular recognition of the domain of the church, but not a subordination to the church. God gave the state the gift of human wisdom whereby to order its affairs. He gave the church the gift of the revealed Word whereby men are redeemed from evil. The ministry of the church has no business in temporal administration and no right to its emoluments or possessions.

It may be said that Luther is presupposing a Christian society, and the reply would be that he was dealing with one that professed to be Christian. In such a society, where the secular order rules according to the law, one may expect that the law shall be interpreted as divine, and that the ruler and subject alike, if believers in the Gospel, would obey the law gladly, even understanding that law better because of the enlightenment of the Spirit. However, Luther was under no illusion as to the character of contemporary society. He expected that the law would have to be enforced on very reluctant, even resisting, subjects. Only the law would save society from chaos and anarchy, even self-destruction. Even a government of Christians would have to execute the law with stern measures. "I have often taught that the world ought not and cannot be ruled according to the Gospel and Christian love, but only by strict laws, with sword and force, because the world is evil and accepts neither Gospel nor love, but lives and acts according to its own will unless it is compelled by force."¹⁵ Christian charity did not mean forgiveness of unrepentant law-breakers. The use of force was essential

14 *WA*, XII, 331, 31 ff. (*Epistel S. Petri gepredigt und ausgelegt*, 1523).

15 *WML*, IV, 28 (*On Trading and Usury*, 1524).

to the government, whereas it was repugnant in the realm of faith. In dealing with its citizens a state had to rely on its best wisdom and be ready to use the sword against those who would destroy the conditions which made community life possible.

Where, then, does the church affect the character of government? Luther never deluded himself into believing that a majority of the people would be true Christians—there were not enough Christians even to make a pure church! But the minority was the salt that kept the whole from corruption. Even the existence of a government by law was the result of the Christian teaching of the law, though theoretically a legal authority might exist in a non-Christian land by virtue of natural law. In a Christian land the believers should set the example of civic righteousness, and in such a land the rulers might, in emergency, facilitate the reformation of the church. "Indeed, reason is the light in this dwelling, and unless the spirit which is lighted by the brighter light of faith controls this light of reason, it cannot but be in error."¹⁶ But however much the Christian citizen contributed to the welfare of his fellowmen, he could claim no merit for it before God—*coram Deo* he was always a sinner, repentant and seeking forgiveness. There was no ground for spiritual pride by reason of any civic virtues.

The great achievement of Luther was his unraveling of the tangled threads of medieval thought wherein faith and works, Gospel and law, church and state had become confused and obscure. Luther went back to the scriptural foundations and clarified the meaning of righteousness before God and justice before the law. He purified the meaning of spiritual life without destroying its indissoluble connection with bodily life. He gave new eminence to secular authority by relating it to the church and placing both under the one God. He set new standards by which men have judged both his and following ages, and gave impetus to movements which have greatly changed the character of church bodies and civil states.

The modern reader is apt to find in Luther a very different conception of government from his own. He will have to recall that when Luther speaks of temporal authority he has in mind chiefly the territorial prince of Germany who exercised a semi-feudal lordship over his

16 *Ibid.*, III, 133 (*The Magnificat*, 1520-21).

subjects. It is true that the prince in turn owed allegiance to the emperor, and the Empire is not absent from Luther's thought, though in a remote, shadowy form. The government is often associated with parental authority, and the citizen is to be subject to the authority above him in much the same sense as the child owes obedience to the parent. Luther was unable to comprehend how there could be a variety of religious faiths in one community, and it seemed to him that political unity must be closely related to religious unity. It was to require a whole series of wars before the concept of a government neutral in religious matters could become established in the minds of men. And Luther is prone to think of all government in a pessimistic vein. It has been instituted because of sin, and its function is to restrain the evil in man. The idea of the welfare state is a modern one, as well as the hope that man can much improve his lot through political measures. Even the unified, national state is later than Luther, and the relations between Christian and non-Christian states had yet to be thought through. Luther must be judged by the standards of his own age, and in his thought the responsibility of the individual to a rather personal form of government was conceived in a more direct and simple way than would be possible in the modern, complex, socialized state. Nor can it be forgotten that for Luther the time seemed not far off when the Lord would appear and bring to an end the present state of man and society. Our day, on the contrary, is heir of the age of rationalism and is tempted to think of no other future kingdom than man himself may create.

Yet, despite all these differences, I believe that Luther would claim that the Christian is to live his faith in his own age. However the church or the state is organized, Christ is present in Word and sacrament to redeem and change man and give him power to live in the Spirit. The spiritual life is creative and finds the way in which to express itself. There is no unchanging set of laws which Christians obey in every age and thereby become righteous. We ask in vain for the prescriptions we should follow in our complicated world of today. If we hear the Word, it will direct us to the will of God, and we must trust it to open our eyes to the means by which that will can be done by us. For the name of God will be hallowed and his will done, apart from ourselves, but our prayer is that it may be hallowed and this will done by

us. Luther would hardly have granted that the Christian is helpless because of untoward circumstances of his social context, but would hold that the gift of the Spirit is to enable a man to overcome these circumstances, at least in so far as they enslave him in sin. But Luther would also call on all Christians—as he called on the nobility, the princes, the teachers, the preachers, the artisans of his age—to fulfill the duties of their vocations, and every Christian would therefore find in his calling the opportunity to use whatever talents he possessed for the welfare and care of his fellowmen. It is through serving his neighbor that the Christian brings the power of God's kingdom into his age.

Christian Love and Public Policy Today

BY FRANKLIN SHERMAN

WHEN we think of "Christian love," we rightly think of a love that is in some manner imitative of the love that God in Christ has shown to us. This is a love that is indiscriminate, showering its grace on the just and the unjust alike. It is self-emptying, not self-aggrandizing. This is the love which "bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things," to quote St. Paul in 1 Cor. 13; which means the putting on of "compassion, kindness, lowliness, meekness," as Paul explains to the Colossians. It is a love expressed not only toward the brother and the neighbor, but also toward the enemy, as Jesus himself insists in the Sermon on the Mount.

The question that immediately arises when we conjoin this conception with that of "public policy" is, "Can Christian love itself be public policy?" If the question be taken at face value, we shall probably find two types of immediate response: that of Christians on the one hand, and that of policy-makers on the other (overlooking for the moment the fact that these may be two dimensions of the same individual).

The naive Christian response would be to assert that Christian love, of course, *could* be public policy, if only the public were willing to adopt it. Thus, for example, an early draft of a statement on social issues prepared for consideration by the National Lutheran Council at its 1959 meeting called on the American people and the United States government to recognize that "love is the true essence of harmonious human relationships" and that "the only ultimately effective power toward world peace is to be found in love rather than in force." Similar sentiments have been voiced in the recent debate over the abolition of capital punishment. In former decades, one found this conception of Christian love as the proper public policy expressed in terms of a critique of the capitalistic economic system. The "service-motive" was to be substituted for the "profit-motive." (In recent years, whether because the critics have been lulled by the affluence of our society or

frightened by the crusades against non-conformity, such criticisms of our fundamental economic motivations have become more and more rare.) It is this same emphasis on Christian love as in itself the proper public policy that decries the concept of the "national interest" as the criterion of foreign policy and, at the extreme, opposes all employment of armaments.

Quite opposite, one suspects, would be the reaction of most of those who are actually charged with the formation and execution of public policy. We may take as typical here the figure of Max Weber, the great German historian and social scientist. Although he never held public office, Weber was a dedicated student of politics and exercised considerable influence as a critic and adviser during the first two decades of this century. His essay "Politics as a Vocation"¹ remains one of the classic statements pertinent to our theme.

Weber was never willing to identify himself with Christian faith; he refused to make the "sacrifice of the intellect" which he conceived this to demand. Likewise, we may say, he refused to make the "sacrifice of political responsibility" which he conceived the Christian ethic to demand. For he read the New Testament closely, and he took it literally. The Sermon on the Mount, he insisted, "is no joking matter. The same holds for this ethic as has been said of causality in science: it is not a cab which one can have stopped at one's pleasure; it is all or nothing." For this ethic means wholly to give up self-seeking, to give up possessions, to give up all forms of compulsion and even of self-defense. To a politician such injunctions, says Weber, are "socially senseless." To turn the other cheek may be to the Christian an act of saintliness; to the politician it is "an ethic of indignity." "The genius or demon of politics," Weber concludes, "lives in an inner tension with the god of love, with the Christian God as expressed by the church. This tension can at any time lead to an irreconcilable conflict."²

Would Martin Luther have agreed with Max Weber in this analysis? The preceding paper has shown that Luther did indeed have a strong sense for political realities, so much so that he has sometimes been accused of being merely a Machiavelli in Christian guise. The

1 To be found in the volume *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press [Galaxy Books], 1960).

2 *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

lines quoted in footnote 6, for instance, show clearly that Luther did *not* expect the socio-political order to be directly governed by the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount. Yet Luther did not feel, as did Weber, irreconcilably torn between the realm of Caesar and the realm of Christ. Could it be that Weber's failure to find the point of reconciliation is due to a misinterpretation of the nature of Christian love, and possibly also a misinterpretation of the nature of politics itself?

It seems clear that in his understanding of the Christian ethic, Max Weber was deeply influenced by his famous contemporary and friend, Leo Tolstoi. Tolstoi, after his conversion, resolved to take the Sermon on the Mount with utmost literalness; in fact, he may be called the ethical literalist *par excellence*. To take no thought for the morrow, to take leave of one's possessions, never to resist evil with force: these injunctions Tolstoi accepted for himself, and he urged them upon all. Thus Christianity involved for him not only pacifism and egalitarianism but also anarchism, for government as such he considered antithetical to Christian ethics. All this was implicit in his interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount as a set of absolute and universal moral laws.

But did Jesus mean to promulgate such universal laws? Hardly, according to contemporary biblical interpretation—and here Luther would be in full agreement. At least four considerations may be adduced in connection with this point. In the first place, Jesus' teaching must be viewed in the context of his total work. His primary purpose was to announce the kingdom of God—and to embody it (for he was its King). His ethic is an ethic for *this* kingdom, not directly for "the kingdoms of this world." Secondly, this meant that his was an ethic for a new community, his "little flock" called out from the world (note that the Sermon on the Mount is directed to the disciples, not the crowd—Matt. 5:1).

Thirdly, Jesus' words are primarily descriptive, not prescriptive (blessed *are* the meek, the merciful). They describe the character of one in whom an inner transformation has already taken place; the ethical injunctions presuppose that transformation. And finally, even in so far as Jesus' words do have the character of an imperative, they deal with concrete cases rather than general laws. "Here is a picture of love operating," Jesus says—sometimes with a seeming passivity, as in turning the other cheek to the Roman overlord (and thus, as St.

Paul intimates, heaping coals of shame upon his head); sometimes with purposeful activity, as in the instance of the Samaritan helping the wounded stranger on the road. In neither case does Jesus imply that this will automatically solve the underlying problem, whether it be Roman tyranny or Jewish brigandage. He did not see fit to give prescriptions for the social and political order as such. If "Luther was no politician," neither was Jesus Christ.

But this does not imply that the "imitation of Christ" should remove *us* from the realm of politics. Luther once remarked that he was often asked, "Why should we marry if Jesus did not? Why should we take up worldly responsibilities if our Lord declined them?" Luther's reply was that to marry simply was not consonant with Jesus' calling, with his special role in life (to be an itinerant preacher, to be a healer forced to flee the crowds, to become "a sign that is spoken against," to go to a youthful martyrdom). His not marrying in no way canceled the conviction that marriage is "a blessed estate, ordained of God." The same may be said of politics. It was not Jesus' function to give political directives, much less to take up public office; but the Christian, constrained by his example of self-giving love, may in the exercise of love today be moved to do precisely that.

Love, then, provides the Christian's motive for concern with public policy, but it does not in itself provide a policy. The history of the early Christian community is instructive at this point. Sociologically speaking, Christianity was for many years a marginal, minority movement in the Roman world. Not only were its numbers few, but it included, as St. Paul reminded the Corinthians, "not many" who were "wise according to worldly standards," not many "powerful," not many "of noble birth" (I Cor. 1:26). The early Christians were not in a position to influence public policy. It is this as much as any other factor that accounts for the restriction of the ethics of the New Testament, by and large, to matters of personal and familial morality, as well as for the seeming passivity of the utterances on political and economic questions which we do find, for instance, in the Pauline epistles. But when by increase of numbers, conversion of leadership groups, and finally adoption as the official religion of the Empire, Christianity did gain opportunity to influence public life, then its inherent positive concern for politics came to the fore. By what means, however, did Chris-

tian thought at this point achieve the articulation of a social policy? Not by the simple application of the Sermon on the Mount, but rather, it would seem, by a threefold process: (1) by the revivification of the powerful concern for social justice to be found in the Old Testament; (2) by the critical appropriation of the best of "secular" social philosophy, particularly that of Stoicism; and (3) by reflection on the concrete situation then at hand—i.e. by the application of what Aristotle called "practical wisdom." In each of these respects, the fathers of the church may serve as models for our own approach to questions of public policy.

The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that Christianity, even in its infancy, was wholly indifferent to matters political. In one respect, it made a noteworthy contribution, albeit a negative one: in its refusal to bow the knee to Caesar in emperor-worship. We see this reflected already in the book of Revelation, with its depiction of the demonic beast that persecutes the servants of the Lamb. Although this witness may make little positive contribution to public policy, it remains of relevance wherever man is threatened by a totalitarian regime.

We have seen, then, that Christianity is not so simple a phenomenon, nor are Christian ethics so unsubtle, as Max Weber assumed. May we not question also his definition of politics? "'Politics' for us," writes Weber, "means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power."³ For Weber, politics by definition is power-politics; and as for its "demon," he may well have had in mind Lord Acton's dictum, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." But is politics merely a struggle for power? Is it simply a matter of each group within a society striving to achieve supremacy for the furtherance of its own interest? Could not politics be equally well defined as a *struggle for justice*—a vehicle through which concern for the common weal can be expressed?

To be sure, power is sought, for its exercise is the specific means of action in the political dimension. But when "the common welfare" is in mind, then power holds its place precisely as a means, rather than an end in itself. The definition of a political party offered by Edmund Burke reflects this viewpoint. A party, according to Burke, is "a body

3 *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

of men, united for the purpose of promoting by their joint endeavors the *public* interest, upon some principle on which they are all agreed" (emphasis added).⁴

Of course, the Christian will recognize the tendency of men to promote their private interests under the rubric of the public interest. He will be well aware of the efforts that men make to disguise their individually and collectively self-oriented actions under a cloak of altruism. But he will be equally aware and appreciative of the genuine altruism that finds expression in public life—not only from time to time in movements of reform, but in the dedicated daily work of men and women in all branches of the government. Christians are concerned that man's limitations and his propensity toward sin be recognized; but Christian faith is by no means to be identified with cynicism. We need to guard against the tendency that Gustaf Aulen calls the "false blackening of the world."⁵

Theologically, this balanced concept of politics is rooted in the peculiarly twofold or stereoscopic Christian view of human nature. Man on the one hand is viewed as made in the "image of God." He has a special dignity among God's creatures, possessed of freedom, rationality, and powers of creativity akin to God's very own. At the same time he is responsible to God for the faithful use of these powers. As a matter of fact, he has not used them faithfully. Man is *imago Dei*, but at the same time man is sinner. Man's history thus is the story of the dialectic between his greatness and his misery. This means for politics: the dialectic between the public interest and the private interests, between politics as a struggle for justice and politics as a struggle for power. A reference to footnote 10 in the preceding paper will show that Luther held just such a dialectical view of the nature of political order: "the law" and "the sword" were his terms for its two elements.

Thus *justice* is the great middle term into which love is translated when active in the social order. The seeking for justice has been defined as "what Christian love does when confronted by more than one neighbor." Let us picture, for instance, a college professor confronted by a

4 Quoted in Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York: Holt, 1949), p. 240.

5 Aulen, *Church, Law, and Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1948).

class of twenty students. He loves them each, and he loves them all. He loves them each: thus his task is to bring out the potentialities of each individual, to attend to his needs as a distinctive person. But he loves them all: therefore he cannot attend to one or two to the exclusion of the rest, and when he gives an examination, its grading must be "just" to all. If the need for retributive justice, i.e. punishment, should arise (for cheating or some other such infraction of the rules), is it not the part of love, as well as justice, to administer such discipline? Even the God of love must needs express himself in wrath against unruly man.

Thus justice is the form love takes in the public order. And it may be noted that both terms combine an individual and a social reference. We think of love as directed toward an individual, and yet love also is the name for a relationship between or among individuals. We speak of doing justice *to* a person; and yet justice is the name for a relationship *among* persons. One of the contributions that Christianity can make to any social order is to help maintain this balance between the needs of the individual and the claims of the community. For is it not true that social history and social thought have tended to veer between extremes of individualism and collectivism? Christian love is much concerned for the freedom of the individual—for his personal, political, economic, and religious freedom. At the same time, it does not overlook the context of community which makes that freedom meaningful, nor does it forget that social action frequently is needful precisely in order to secure or to protect the freedom of the individual. Conversely, Christianity views positively the role of government in promoting public welfare, and it acknowledges the necessity in a society such as our own for large-scale social organization. But at the same time it is alert to the danger of the individual's submersion in the bureaucracy, the begetting of the "organization man"—whether it be in government, in business, in the labor movement, in the university, or in the church.

Thus we may sum up the Christian's pathway of approach to questions of public policy in terms of two formulations: *faith active in love*, and *love seeking justice*. But what, more precisely, is justice? Beyond what we have said about the balance between individual and community, can it be more precisely defined?

It seems to be one of the major conclusions of Protestant social

thought in recent decades that the content of a just social order *cannot* be defined once and for all. Here Protestant thought stands in contrast with Roman Catholicism, which maintains that there is a specifically "natural" order whose character should be self-evident to human reason, although since reason is beclouded the church's guidance may be required in order that the demands of natural law may be discerned. Protestant faith, realizing the fallibility of human judgments and the forever-changing character of historical reality, is wary of identifying any particular social pattern either as "natural" or as "Christian." It is this understanding of the matter that underlay, for instance, the rejection by the Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1948 of any effort to define either communism or capitalism as *the* Christian order, in the face of efforts that had been made in East and West, respectively, to make just that sort of identification.

Thus for the Protestant Christian, the search for justice is precisely that—a search, a process of inquiry which must be forever carried on. The Christian is impelled by love to be concerned with public policy. His faith contributes certain broad perspectives, and it does rule out extreme alternatives—for example, those of anarchism or totalitarianism. Within these boundaries, the Christian stands on the same footing with those who share his passion for the public welfare, participating in the great debate on social philosophies and political programs. The Christian should be able to bring to discussion of policy questions considerable wisdom about man; but he has no set of detailed answers packaged in advance.

One special problem, in conclusion, presents itself. In what sense or to what extent does Christian love permit the assertion of one's own interests? Here is a complex issue on which there is no unanimity among the interpreters of Christian ethics. Jesus taught (quoting from the Old Testament), "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Did he mean thereby to command love of self as well as neighbor? One school of thought holds that he did, although of course he meant (to use Augustine's phrase) a "proper" love of self, i.e. a love of the self-in-God. An opposite interpretation is that Jesus does not command self-love at all, but merely presupposes it. Assuming self-love as an existing phenomenon, he commands us to reverse it. To the extent and in the way that you (naturally) love yourself, so (as a Christian) you

shall love your neighbor. Thus self-love as such has no ethical status but serves negatively as a measure for neighbor-love.

Without being able to resolve this issue, we should in any case have to agree that if one is to love, there has to be a self to do the loving. Only one who is in some sense a centered self, sufficiently in command of his own faculties to direct his life toward neighbor-service, is in a position to obey the injunction to do so. The term "self-love," however, may well imply an undue attachment to the self's own welfare, what the psychiatrist would call narcissism. May we not rather speak of the profound *self-acceptance* which the Christian knows, grounded in his faith that God accepts him (despite his unacceptability if judged by his deserts)? The Christian accepts himself realistically, with all his limitations as well as his potentialities. Following from such self-acceptance, then, is the legitimate *self-affirmation* that prevents the Christian from being merely a Caspar Milquetoast. Such self-affirmation is really another form of justice, in this case justice to one-self. But its ethical legitimacy disappears immediately unless one can still presuppose that the entire life is neighbor-oriented. We have here what one interpreter of Christian ethics has called the "vocational duty of the self": first the sense of calling, and then the necessary preparation of the self for service in that calling.⁶

Cannot this viewpoint be applied, analogously, to questions of social policy? Consider, for instance, the staff employee of a labor union. Presumably he accepts the legitimacy of the movement in whose service he is working; he accepts the role he occupies. This corresponds to the fundamental self-acceptance mentioned above. Given this, it follows that he has a duty to affirm the interests of those he represents, whether in collective bargaining or in politics. One may say that he is bound to do this anyway or lose his job, and this is true; but if your interpretation of Christian ethics is correct, there is this difference: he can, as a Christian, engage in this legitimate group self-affirmation with good conscience. Always, however, this affirmation of self-interest must be limited by the corresponding interests of other groups, as well as by the group's own calling to transcend itself in making some contribution to the common weal.

6 Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York: Scribner's, 1950).

The same reasoning would apply to the difficult question of the pursuit of the "national interest" in foreign policy. One need not be uncritical about American society and culture, but if one considers our nation as worthy at least of continued existence, then one may legitimately affirm and defend her interests. Always, however, this affirmation will be limited by the legitimate interests of other nations, and will find its context in some conception of our nation's special calling in the world community—a calling centering today, perhaps, in the opportunity to share its affluence as well as its democratic heritage with the peoples newly emerging into nationhood.

We have spoken extensively about the love wherewith the Christian loves, but in the end we must return to that which is more fundamental—the love wherewith he is loved. "As the peaceful lake is grounded deep in the hidden spring which no eye can see," wrote Søren Kierkegaard, "so a man's love is grounded even deeper in the love of God. If there were at bottom no well-spring, if God were not love, then there would be no quiet lake or human love. As the quiet lake is grounded darkly in the deep spring, so is human love mysteriously grounded in God's love." It is this which gives the Christian courage to concern himself with public policy.

7 Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*, translated by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).

The Contradiction Called Man

BY JACK EVERETT SMITH

DOES man belong to the realm of angels or animals? The answer of Scripture and experience is that he belongs to both. We need not espouse Greek body/mind dualism to recognize that man is a contradiction. It is a fact of human experience.

Man cannot be completely at home in the world. As a species of the animal kingdom he is out of place and is forever awakening to this startling fact, like the prodigal in the swine pen coming to himself. He is not just flesh; he is spirit. He transcends his own mortality, his own finiteness.

Yet he cannot dash off into some different world. The situation given with his present existence is the material one. To dream and to realize is to evaporate unless these are linked with sinew and sweat and this earthbound existence.

It is this contradiction, this inability to identify himself, that leads man into much despair. He is constantly battling with these two strands of his nature, first following one and then the other, but finding that he cannot escape from either of them. God formed man from the dust and said to him, "You are dust, and to dust you shall return" (Gen. 3:19). But into this same creature God breathed the breath of life and man became a living soul (*nephesh*, Gen. 2:7). Whether we translate *nephesh* as soul or being, the intimacy of this act of creation sets man apart. We are given to understand that man is a special act of creation and that God did not breathe into the nostrils of every fish, bird, and animal. Thus man is akin both to God and to the animals. He is both matter and spirit. Which realm is his native habitat? In which is he to place his membership? Can he be a kind of amphibian that divides his time and his interest between the seas and the dry land? This is the big question of man's self-realization.

The solution to this dilemma is one of the chief objectives of Kierkegaard in his book, *Sickness Unto Death*. He says that the "self is a conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude, whose task is to be-

come itself, a task which can be performed only by means of a relationship to God."¹ Kierkegaard points out that there are three possible approaches that the self may take. It may seek fulfillment through finitude and ignore its infinitude, or it may do just the reverse. Both of these lead to despair. The other possibility is that of faith, in which both aspects of human nature are accepted and recognized before God. Accordingly Kierkegaard defines faith in this frame of reference: "the self in being itself and in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in God."²

What happens when man seeks self-realization in finitude? Man is bound to the material. He is enmeshed in time. His body is akin to the clod, and he spends his years as a tale that is told. Taking his cue from these limitations, man may seek to find all the meaning and realization of his existence within this material-time framework. This is what Kierkegaard described as the aesthete or immediate man. It is roughly equal to materialist or hedonist. St. Paul described such persons by saying, "Their end is destruction, their god is the belly, and they glory in their shame, *with minds set on earthly things*." (Phil. 3:19).

This latter description of the aesthete is true in that he seeks the meaning of his existence in direct satisfaction of his senses, but what he feeds his senses is subject to much refinement. He may be a glutton or a gourmet; enjoy jazz or a symphony; drink corn squeezin's or the fanciest cocktail. But whether crude or cultured, coarse or refined, there is the despair of finitude.

This despair is manifest in the after-taste of the aesthete. The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing (Eccl. 1:86). How bitter is the after-taste of the man who seeks pleasure desperately as a means of self-realization. The man who lives for the sensuous moment will be bankrupt in bitterness as soon as the moment is over. All the while his soul seeks some larger setting. His spirit clings to the hope that the sensuous moment is framed about with some more noble goal. If his spirit cannot find such a goal, the very best solace in which his heart can take refuge is that this pleasure may last

1 Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* and *The Sickness unto Death*, trans. by Walter Lowrie (Anchor Book, Doubleday and Co., 1954), pp. 162, 163.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 162.

beated. Repetition is the soul's hope of finding eternity in the immediate.

God has put eternity into man's mind (Eccl. 3:11). Therefore eternity is a necessity for man even for the enjoyment of the temporal. Nothing could be more inaccurate than the advice of the Epicureans, "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die." No man can rejoice because he dies tomorrow. Mortality is no adequate motive for being merry. A man may attempt to be merry in spite of it, but he can never be merry because of it.

No man rejoices in death. He may commit suicide, but that is only escape from a bankrupt life. It is a leap of fear from something he fears worse. As Kierkegaard said, "When death is the greatest danger, one hopes for life; but when one becomes acquainted with an even more dreadful danger, one hopes for death."³ A prisoner will seek to escape even through the sewer; not because he loves sewers, but because he hates prisons. No man can rejoice because he dies. (A dying man may rejoice, but the source of his joy will not be in death but in God.)

Thus the futility of moving only in the direction of the finite is seen in that the infinite is required before man can truly enjoy the finite. He cannot really rejoice in his finitude. He cannot rejoice because he is mortal. There are some things we can do desperately, but we cannot rejoice desperately. It is possible for a condemned man to enjoy his last meal, but never because it is his last. The light of some greater meaning must first play upon it. He may eat it with enjoyment, knowing that his sins are forgiven and that he can confidently face eternity. He may eat it with some satisfaction, knowing that he is dying for a good cause and that the cause will furnish a continuing justification for his life. But the most fruitless undertaking is to try to find joy from the heavy curfew hanging over his head.

So the heart of the hedonist, seeking the eternity which it craves and being limited to the immediate, fashions for itself a temporary immortality of pleasure. The hedonist rejoices in the illusion of the eternal nature of his enjoyment. His spirit is that of the rich fool described in Jesus' parable (Luke 12:16-21). This fool did not quote the Ep-

icurean motto, "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die." But what did he say? "Eat, drink, and be merry. . . ." Why? ". . . because thou hast much goods laid up *for many years*." It was the prospect of continuing enjoyment that pleased his heart, a temporary eternity of pleasure.

Isaiah captures the characteristic spirit of the pleasure-lovers in this description:

Come, they say, let us get wine,
Let us fill ourselves with strong drink;
AND TOMORROW WILL BE LIKE THIS DAY,
GREAT BEYOND MEASURE (Isa. 56:12).

It is the idea of an eternity of pleasure, even if false, which makes so sweet. But the spirit inevitably becomes weary of this substitute eternity. The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing. The qualitative lack cannot be met with a quantitative increase. The substitute is so unsatisfactory that the out-and-out hedonist usually becomes acutely conscious of his despair. Such a man can testify, as does the late Errol Flynn in his diary, "You can love every instant of living and still want to be dead."⁴

The kind of finitizing that attaches itself to the state or to materialistic goals that are acceptable to society is far more insidious than the rebellious hedonism that flouts social custom. The substitute eternity is more satisfying because it is more refined. Its form is not as coarse as that of the hedonist. It speaks of culture and makes use of the fine arts. Its goal or aim is the good life, gracious living, and success. Nevertheless, it is secular; all its roots are in this age. It is finitizing, with no conscious relation to the absolute. As such it is despair. Such a person has never yet become a self.

But a man never becomes quite as "immediate" as Kierkegaard's description of the "immediate man."⁵ It may be correct as a theoretical possibility, but man in the immediate never quite succeeds in being at home and at ease. Man as an animal is in an unconvincing role. He can

4 Quoted in *Newsweek*, January 4, 1960, p. 62.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 184 ff.

er be satisfied to just eat, excrete, procreate, and retreat, though he ns to do it very delicately. He can never manage the light natural- s of the animal kingdom. If he becomes an animal, it is always a tesque creature—nothing humorous and wholesome like a giraffe a kangaroo, but a most unbeastly beast. All this is because man is a thesis of infinitude and finitude. The single motion toward finitude herefore despair.

But what about the opposite motion toward infinitude? Kierkegaard s that this is also despair, the despair of infinitude. Christians who uld say a hearty amen to what has been said about the despair of tude, may be surprised and taken aback when told there is a despair of infinitude. This means that the single motion toward infinity is also or. It is not a correct assessment of the situation of man to regard finitude as his sin and his infinitude as his salvation.

Man has often regarded his body as a prison for his spirit. Instead glorifying his body as the hedonist or immediate man, he has been amed of it. He is dissatisfied with the ultimate value of matter and ates the root of his unhappiness in the flesh. For this reason he feels lty about his finite nature.

The idealistic poet soul, crying from what he regards as the son of his flesh, is a picture of the despair of infinitude. The poet al is all hunger and openness. It gulps in surroundings like a drown- g man gasping air, but it does not find its solid goal. Mostly it is e tossing of a disturbed dream, a soul so expanding in its hungry reach that instead of encompassing eternity, it is itself split and attered.

The poet soul without God finds nothing but pain. It may cultivate nsitivity and whet the power of sympathy. It may turn the tenderest e of feeling toward the rough realities of the world and try to read e meaning of the universe like a blind man's finger reading braille, th the bare edge of the soul. Any soul who does that without really owing God invites for himself much suffering. He cannot restrain his es of protest until in bitterness his rebel soul inflicts its own suffer- g. His going out may then be like a mad man being dragged off eaming to his cell; or like the stoic he may steel the edge with sperate determination, not sensing that the head "bloody but un- wed" is a victory in a make-believe war, while the darkness "black

as a pit" is the tragedy of a blinded soul. It is only the poet who stands before God in faith who combines sensitivity with strength. He sees not the projected image of his own hunger and emptiness, but God. It is only when a poet stands before God that he becomes not a seeker only, but a seer.

A man who rejects the material, and that part of himself that is material, may be admirable in many ways, but he is also pitiful. Francis of Assisi, calling his body "brother ass," is a different ideal from Christ, who took upon himself the flesh, not like a challenger arranging a duel, not to conquer flesh or gain a victory over it in the name of the spiritual, but to reveal God. Thus the Word became flesh.

The first essential in true self-realization is to stand before God in faith. Kierkegaard says, "A herdsman who (if it were possible) is a self only in the sight of cows is a very low self, and so also is a ruler who is a self in the sight of slaves. . . . But what an infinite accent falls upon the self by getting God as a measure."⁶ Man, who is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, becomes a whole because he is standing before the one God and creator of all.

Standing before God erases the importance of any body/spiritualism. The greater dualism of man/God all but eliminates the consciousness of any cleavage between matter and spirit within ourselves. The man in his whole being stands before God. The body is God's handiwork and subject to sin, but the spirit is also God's handiwork and subject to sin. God did not make man flesh and spirit and then require that man be all spirit. That is not the essence of man's sin. That men falsely assume that this is so is the occasion for much religious despair. This idea leads to what Kierkegaard calls "the sin of poetizing instead of being, of standing in relation to the Good and True through imagination instead of existentially striving to be it."⁷

The supreme dualism is man standing before God, and that is what the Bible does not play up the conflict of matter and spirit within man. Man does not become acceptable to God by being spiritualized, but by being redeemed. Redemption is not of the spirit only, nor of the body only, but of the whole being. "Accordingly the development consists in

6 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 208.

ing away from oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and in returning to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing."⁸

This double movement means that both aspects of man's nature fulfilled. This is not a compromise, no midway mixture, no reasonable moderation. The two parts of man's nature will not blend into a product. To seek compromise is to be forever pulled between the two. Faith consists not of compromise but of exhausting and fulfilling the possibilities of man's nature. What this means we see in Kierkegaard's description of the Knight of Faith.⁹ This man "belongs entirely to the world, no Philistine more so." "Yet this man has made and every instant is making the movements of infinity." "He resigned everything finitely, and then he grasped everything again by virtue of the absurd."

Here is the secret of man's relation to the material world. He is not to be lost in it. Neither is he to reject it in a sensible manner as the reasonable man espouses moderation, nor in a proud manner as the stoic does. He loses his life absolutely, only to find it absolutely. With infinite resignation he has drained the cup of life's profound sadness, he knows the bliss of the finite, he senses the pain of renouncing everything, the dearest things he possesses in the world, and yet loneliness tastes to him just as good as to one who never knew anything higher."¹⁰

This last part can be stated even more strongly. It is not that it tastes to him "*just as good*" as to one who never knew anything higher"; it tastes to him *far better*. This is the paradox of material possessions and sensual pleasure. They are only good so long as they are not too important. A little wine may be enjoyable so long as it is not really necessary for happiness. But make of it a god and place on it the whole burden of our bliss, as does Omar Khayyam, and then what a source of sadness it becomes. It is only on a man of faith that possessions are well. It is only when we recognize the transcendent value of the eternal that we are properly qualified to handle the temporal.

Nothing less than faith can make us good stewards. Otherwise our gifts will be rent paid, and all our virtue will be works righteous-

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49 ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

ness. We cannot with the proper spirit give anything until we recognize that God is the owner of everything.

That is why Jesus does not describe the kingdom of God as a compromise. "The kingdom of heaven is like a treasure hidden in a field which a man found and covered up; then in his joy he goes and sells all that he has and buys that field" (Matt. 13:44). First is the infinite resignation, "seek ye first the kingdom of God," and then the receiving back of the finite, "and all these things shall be yours as well."

The double motion means that the kingdom of God becomes a consuming to the Christian, but that does not mean that he goes off and hopes to be martyred or lives the life of a hermit. He remains in his station, but he does so light-heartedly and without desperation. St. Paul says, "Let those who have wives live as though they had none, and those who mourn as though they were not mourning, and those who rejoice as though they were not rejoicing, and those who buy as though they had no goods, and those who deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it. For the form of this world is passing away" (I Cor. 7:29-31).

Paul does not say they should refrain from these things. He reminds them that there is another factor, however, which sheds a new light on them all. Standing before God is such a transforming power.

In the conscious presence of God the self becomes concrete. The first experience of this comes as guilt, the second as forgiveness. When the woman taken in adultery was brought before Jesus, she was filled with shame and guilt. That is the inverted expression of her infinitude. Animals that copulate by instinct cannot understand adultery or feel guilt because of it.

But just as her feeling of guilt was the expression of her infinitude, so her acceptance of forgiveness was the expression of her finitude. Receiving forgiveness meant returning to herself infinitely by the process of finitizing. It meant accepting herself as an adulteress, the same body with the same organs, the same self, and accepting it with redeemed gladness and joy.

Receiving forgiveness always involves returning to oneself. There is no experience of forgiveness without that. We cannot escape ourselves. The self cannot be exchanged, but it can be redeemed by being

ed up to infinity and accepted in finitude. That is, it is denied in entrance and accepted in forgiveness.

Henry Sloane Coffin has a passage in which he reviews the bitten, eroded years behind us, fellow-sinners; years blasted by conceit or stunted in drifting or consumed in self-serving. "God may cast our sins behind his back, and remember them no more against us. But the record stands—the pathetic record of what we might have been and might have done in the days that are no more."¹ Then he quotes this sonnet by Rossetti:

The lost days of my life until today,
What were they, could I see them on the street
Lie as they fell? Would they be ears of wheat
Sown once for food, but trodden into clay?

Or golden coins squandered and still to pay?
Or drops of blood dabbling the guilty feet?
Or such spilt water as in dreams must cheat
The undying throats of hell, athirst alway?

I do not see them here; but after death
God knows the faces I shall see,
Each one a murdered self, with low last breath.
"I am thyself,—what hast thou done to me?"
"And I—and I—thyself," (lo, each one saith,)
"AND THOU THYSELF TO ALL ETERNITY!"

Thou thyself to all eternity. Forgiveness is not to become a different self, but a redeemed self. The Psalmist cries (25.7) "Remember not the sins of my youth, or my transgressions; but according to thy steadfast love REMEMBER ME, for thy goodness' sake, O Lord!" Coffin says, "It is appalling when one sees the very soil of one's nature the breeding-place of these pests of pride and shiftiness and all-absorbing egotism." "Thou thyself to all eternity."

When we pray, "Lord, remember me," it is the past, an inalienable part of ourselves, which we ask Jesus to remember. Turn back to Calvary and that day of crucifixion and observe the penitent thief. Can you not hear his terrifying yesterdays pushing that thief closer to

¹ Henry Sloane Coffin, *Joy in Believing* (New York, 1956), p. 5.

Christ in his desperate need—the starved years calling “Remember me”? And this is the Gospel: “Thou thyself to all eternity shalt be with me.”

What salvation it is when “the self in being itself and in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in God”!

Preaching at Funerals

BY JOHN SCHMIDT

MOST of us have heard of the Chinese ideograph for "crisis" that literally means "dangerous opportunity." There are few tasks to which the pastor is called that deserve this description more than preaching at a funeral. That there are dangers is obvious; that there are opportunities, rather less. Perhaps that is why, in our generation, we can observe a tendency to omit the preaching of the Word from this particular ministry of the church. Is this "meet, right, and salutary?"

Certainly nothing that is said concerning the funeral sermon can be said in a vacuum. The sermon itself is part of a total service, every part of which contributes, positively or negatively, to its effectiveness. Without rudeness, the pastor must insist that this, like every other service that he conducts, is a service of the church and is therefore under her direction. This does not justify him in riding roughshod over the wishes of either the family or the mortician, but it does mean that the pastor will be able to give them such guidance that this will be truly a Christian service. Many of us feel that this is made much easier if the services held in loving memory of church members should—other facts permitting—be held in the church where the deceased and his loved ones have been accustomed to meet God in his Word. The pastor's influence can also be effective in persuading organists and singers to use only great hymns of Christian faith and victory rather than music that can only be described as "tear-jerking."

In this connection it may be added that United Lutheran Church pastors, at least, have two orders that can be used at these services—the "provided for the burial of those who depart this life in the Christian faith" (*Service Book and Hymnal*, p. 253), the other for those who die "without sign of faith" (*Minutes*, ULCA, 1936, p. 439). The use of the latter does not prejudge the eternal fate of any man, for such judgment is reserved to the all-knowing love of God. Certainly no announcement should be made as to the reason for using one order rather than another. But it surely is more honest not to say, for example,

"We commit his body to the ground . . . in sure and certain hope the resurrection to eternal life through our Lord Jesus Christ," but only that we do so "to await the day when our Lord Jesus Christ will come to judge the living and the dead."

ARE SERMONS NEEDED?

A frequent explanation that is offered by those who omit the preached Word from the funeral service is that the all-too-human words of the pastor are less effective and comforting than the great and powerful words of Holy Writ. This sounds so humble and so pious that criticism seems out of place. What pastor would assume to put his sentences in the same category as Psalm 23 or John 14?

Yet is it not true that the same argument would rule out preaching at *every* service? If the unadorned and unexplained biblical Word suffices here, why not everywhere?

Rather, has it not been the basis of Christian preaching from the first century that the written Word needs to be explained and applied before it will bear abundant fruit? The essential ministry of Paul, for example, was to direct his hearers to the Messianic passages of the Old Testament in such a way that they should be brought to the faith that Jesus of Nazareth was in fact the Christ (compare, for example, Acts 13:16-41). He did not assume that they needed nothing more than the text of sacred Scripture. The fact that, with the passing of centuries, "the strange new world of the Bible" should, even in its outward aspects, have become farther removed from us makes this the more necessary. How many laymen know enough about sheep, for example, really to understand the wonderful illustration of God's tenderness that we call Psalm 23? Modern man needs sermons to enable him to understand the Bible.

The funeral sermon is needed, also, to correct the paganism that so often masquerades as Christianity. Think of the common confusion between the Greek belief in the immortality of the soul and the Christian teaching of "the resurrection of the body" (flesh" would be a more exact translation and would be even more shocking!). Or consider the persistence, even in Lutheran circles, of trust in salvation by good works. "Of course he didn't often go to church (usually a gross und-

statement), but he was a good man at heart, who loved his wife and never had trouble with his neighbors." Which, according to the Scriptures, is a sheer denial of God's grace—and at a rather shoddy level. Quite obviously we had better do some good, clear preaching of the gospel at funerals, as well as at other times.

There is no room at a funeral service (if anywhere) for preaching that is intended to display the preacher's cleverness or eloquence. Neither dare it be an occasion for superficial pathos. The situation is far too crucial for anything but a full-orbed proclamation of the whole gospel, focused now upon the bitter need of the bereaved.

THE NATURE OF THIS PREACHING

Negatively, first. It should not consist of a eulogy of the dead. Not merely because eulogy may make the loss more keenly felt, but because the Christian pulpit exists to eulogize *only* the God "who so loved the world that he gave his only Son." Our sermon, and thereby the attention of the listeners, should be focused exclusively on him. If we can honestly do so, we may give thanks for what God has accomplished and through the deceased, but in so doing we should not lose sight of the fact that the real actor in life's drama is God.

Knowing that he is charged with the delivery of a message, the preacher will not forsake honesty in an endeavor to be kind. The comforting doctrine of justification by grace through faith, which is the continuing theme of his week-by-week preaching, dare not be obscured by any extended recital of the good works (real or alleged) of the departed. Why should I expect anyone to believe what I say on Sunday if they have heard me assert the opposite at a funeral service on Wednesday? We must indeed "speak the truth in love," but it must still be the truth that we speak.

There is another sense, also, in which honesty is demanded when the pastor stands before a company of mourners. He must deal truthfully and realistically with the fact of death. Here is no place for a "sweeping optimism" that ignores the fact that the death of a loved one strikes deeply into the hearts of those who are bereaved. Treasured associations are broken off. Even worse, perhaps, is the fact that we are then confronted by the irrevocability of time. What we have not said

before death comes can never be said; or what we have said, unsaid. Death brings with it, therefore, strong emotions of remorse for things done and things undone that can never be changed. This tragedy must be taken seriously. As I read recently on a German calendar: "One does wrong if one seeks to minimize the things that cause another sorrow."

It should perhaps go without saying that the preacher must be truthful in what he says concerning the deceased. It is not only on cemetery inscriptions that an unknown poet could write,

"Tell me, grey-haired sexton," I said,
 "Where in this field are the wicked folks laid?
 I have wandered the quiet old churchyard through
 And studied the epitaphs, old and new;
 But on monument, obelisk, pillar or stone
 I read of no evil that men have done."

Obviously the funeral sermon is not the place to rehearse the inadequacies of the one who has died, but it should be equally obvious that there shall be no occasion for a mourning wife to whisper, during the sermon that had deserted reality (as legend has it), "Johnny, go up to the casket and see if that's your father in there."

It should be added that the funeral sermon should be gracious as well as honest. Its purpose is to heal, to strengthen, and to restore. Hence the preacher dare not succumb to the temptation to take potshots at a captive audience. His words must be positive, affirmative of the durable and life-giving Gospel. Then, above all, he dare waste no time on peripheral truths. His message must be concerned with such fundamental issues as the unavoidable boundaries of life and the splendor of that eternal life that God offers to all men in Christ Jesus. It must be "the old, old story of Jesus and his love," for it alone is able to give abiding comfort to stricken hearts.

ITS USEFULNESS

There are few occasions when people, even those who rarely find their way into our churches (perhaps because they have been disillusioned too often), are as receptive as at such a time. This is the case

ause all men, including the most frivolous and the most materialistic, sobered by the immediate presence of death, which even the clever-
s of the mortician cannot help them fully to escape. Luther is not
only man who made religious vows when he was shockingly con-
nted by the fact that he was mortal. "Foxhole religion" is indeed
adequate, but it may open a long-closed door to biblical faith. The
eral service presents the preacher with "an open door" if he ap-
aches it with honesty and grace, with realism and unshaken hope.

Without minimizing the loss that has been suffered, we can point
th confidence to him whose love and understanding are adequate for
ry need. To the hopeless he can bring hope; to the penitent, for-
eness. From his triumphal resurrection we may learn that we also
nd those whom we have loved long since but lost a while—are of-
ed the gift of eternal life. Thus we can enable our hearers to face
overcome their loss and fears, finding fellowship and peace in him
o loved us even to the cross.

This word we are privileged to proclaim, confident that it will be
ctive "when and where it pleases God," as our Confessions say.
we have God's own promise:

For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven,
and return not thither but water the earth,
making it bring forth and sprout,
giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater,
so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth;
it shall not return to me empty,
but it will accomplish that which I purpose,
and prosper in the thing for which I sent it (Isa. 55:10-11).

However, little the preacher says on such an occasion will be fruit-
unless he himself be gripped with the wonder of that which he
claims. A preacher of Life cannot speak as though he were pro-
ming impending doom. Charles H. Spurgeon gave a valuable hint,
his typically homely fashion, when he told a group of theological
lents that when they spoke of heaven their faces should light up
h a glad and holy radiance and then added, "When you speak of
—well, your regular face will do."

Every funeral sermon should have what Sir William Burne-Jones missed at the funeral of Robert Browning in Westminster Abbey: "was too somber; impressive? yes, but the funeral lacked the note of victory. It just needed, in addition to the singing and the order of the chorister to sing out or a trumpet blast of victory!" If our funeral sermons sound such a note of victory, they will be welcome indeed.

The Confessions in the Church of Sweden

BY BERNHARD ERLING

THE problem of defining the specific nature of the Christian faith for a communion within the Lutheran tradition becomes largely the problem of interpreting its Confessions. In the Church of Sweden, not only the question of their interpretation, but also the question as to which are to be considered the Confessions of the Church of Sweden, has been actual ever since the time of the Reformation, the last discussion of this subject having been held at the general synod of 1934.¹

The Reformation in Sweden, theologically considered, was accomplished primarily through the use of Luther's and Melancthon's teachings as these were interpreted by Olavus and Laurentius Petri, who had studied in Wittenberg.² The Swedish Reformation, which was achieved with such a high degree of continuity that there has never been the feeling that the present Swedish church is in any sense a new church, established at the time of the Reformation,³ was the ordering of the life and teaching of the church in accordance with the nature of the Gospel as this had been rediscovered by Luther.

While the first decisive date in the Swedish Reformation was the Parliament of Västerås of 1527, where through a disputation it was recognized that the German Reformers had good grounds for their views and preached nothing else than God's Word, which, it was insisted, must always be proclaimed in its purity in

1 By "general synod" is meant the Swedish kyrkomöte, a legislative body for the Church of Sweden, developed in connection with the Riksdag reform of 1865. For a discussion of the development of the kyrkomöte, see Per-Olov Ahren, *Kyrkomöte och synodalförfattning. En studie i svensk kyrkoförfattningsdebatt 1827-1865*. Studia theologica Lundensia, 11 (Lund: Gleerups, 1956).

2 For the Reformation in Sweden see Hjalmar Holmquist, *Svenska kyrkans historia*, Vol. II, *Reformationstidevarvet 1521-1611* (Stockholm: SKD, 1933). For a discussion of this period in English, see Conrad Bergendoff, *Olavus Petri and the Ecclesiastical Transformation in Sweden* (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

3 An evidence of this continuity is the fact that Sweden was able in the Reformation to maintain its succession of canonically ordained bishops. This fact has led in recent times to overtures from the Church of England, which also claims such a continuity. See John Wordsworth, *The National Church of Sweden* (London: Mowbray, 1911). This interesting history of the Church of Sweden, the last work of the learned bishop of Salisbury, was first delivered in the form of the Hale Lectures in Chicago, Illinois. It may thus also be viewed as a part of an attempt to establish closer relations between the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Augustana Lutheran Church in the United States. For an appreciative statement of the value of Wordsworth's study, see Nathan Söderblom's foreword to the Swedish translation by Elin Lilien, *Den svenska kyrkan* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1912), pp. xvii-xxxi.

the kingdom,⁴ the Church of Sweden did not subscribe any Confessions until the Uppsala Council of 1593. Prior to this time the whole emphasis was placed on the Bible, which had been translated into Swedish by Olavus Petri in 1541, as the sole norm for Christian teaching. In 1571 Laurentius Petri, the brother of Olavus Petri and archbishop of Uppsala, issued his Church Order,⁵ by which a norm was established for liturgy and polity. In this Church Order of 1571 there is no specific reference to Confessions, and the preaching of the Gospel is defined as preaching forgiveness of sins in the name of Jesus Christ, and in relation thereto preaching repentance.⁶

Laurentius Petri does, however, presuppose the existence of a formulated body of doctrine which is to be taught in the church. He speaks of "*then rena Euangeliska läran*" and of "*then retta och rena Euangeliska Lärorna*."⁷ He says that councils and synods are to be held when any disagreement arises with respect to any article of Christian doctrine.⁸ Great emphasis is placed upon the catechism.⁹ It is most likely that Laurentius Petri's references to the catechism designate the *catechismus canonicus*, which was simply a collection of biblical texts without explanation, but there was also a tendency during this period toward identifying Luther's catechism with the *catechismus canonicus*.¹⁰ In one passage, in which Laurentius Petri discusses doctrinal aids to be used in preaching, he refers to the catechism, "*the almenneliga articular j then Christeliga läronne*" (the universal articles of Christian doctrine), Philip Melanchthon's *Loci communes*, and the Swedish translation of the same, *Margarita theologica*.¹¹

4 Holmquist, *Handbok i svensk kyrkohistoria*, II, p. 17.

5 *Laurentius Petris Kyrkoordning av år 1571* is the title of the most recent edition, edited with an introduction by Emil Färnström (Stockholm: SKD, 1932). This church order was adopted by the church at the Uppsala synod of 1572.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

7 "The pure evangelical doctrine" and "the right and pure evangelical doctrines." *Ibid.*, p. 26.

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 6.

9 It was to be preached on twice during the year, during Advent and Lent, at matins or vespers in the cities, while in the country, where the people could attend only one service, half of the sermon was to be devoted to the catechism during this period, and the other half to the gospel for the day. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

10 Hilding Pleijel, *Vår kyrkas bekännelse* (Lund: Gleerups, 1941), p. 83. Pleijel, who seeks to explain a reference to Luther's Small Catechism in the Swedish Regeringsform (constitution) of 1634, where it is stated that Luther's catechism has been adopted as a confessional writing by a previous Swedish church synod, agrees with Nathan Söderblom that the synod meant must be the Uppsala synod of 1572, when Laurentius Petri's Church Order was approved. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

11 *Laurentius Petris Kyrkoordning av år 1571*, p. 29. Laurentius Petri is here explaining how a preacher can most effectively handle a text so that it will be understood and remembered. He states that it is necessary in this connection to relate the presentation to some portion of the catechism, or to one of the general articles of the Christian faith. If more intensive treatment is desired, the preacher is referred to Melanchthon's *Loci*, which the clergy are advised to study thoroughly in the Swedish version. For a recent discussion of the date of the translation of *Margarita theologica*, see Åke Andrén, "När tillkom vår första svenska lärobok i dogmatik?" in *Nordisk teologi* (Lund: Gleerups, 1955), pp. 210-217.

It does not seem, therefore, that one is justified in concluding from the absence of specific references to Confessions in Laurentius Petri's Church Order that there was any reluctance on his part to think of normative Christian teaching defined in doctrinal terms.¹² At the Uppsala Council of 1572 it was recognized that a confessional statement would be helpful in order to achieve the unity in teaching which the Church Order made possible in worship, and Laurentius Petri was commissioned to prepare such a confession.¹³ He had in mind the writing of a new confession, since he felt that the Swedish church was at that particular time more endangered by errors in the direction of Calvinism than of Catholicism. Thus he did not feel that the Augsburg Confession, which had been oriented in the latter direction, was adapted to the Swedish situation. He did not live, however, to carry out this commission. Besides, with the passing of years the situation changed. Hence when the Augsburg Confession was adopted in 1593, it was done in part to prevent the attempt to force Catholicism on the nation through Sigismund of Poland, a son of the Swedish King John III, who had been reared in the Roman Catholic faith and through his mother had inherited the Polish throne, and now on his father's death was also to inherit the Swedish throne.¹⁴

Einar Billing calls the adoption of the unaltered Augsburg Confession in 1593 a victory of the strictest Lutheran orthodoxy in Sweden.¹⁵ But the full meaning of this victory, in so far as the Confessions were concerned, was yet to be determined. As early as 1611 agitation began on the part of the clergy in favor of including the entire Book of Concord among the confessional writings.¹⁶ While such attempts met with no success for a time, a combination of political factors and theological developments led to a decree in 1663 which stated that in religious instruction in the schools the entire Book of Concord was to be used in interpret-

12 It should be noted in this connection that the Church Order of 1571 is not primarily a formulation of church law but rather a manual in practical theology. Cf. Färnström, *op. cit.*, p. xiv. For example, in connection with his discussion of preaching, Laurentius Petri mentions such practical details as that mothers with fretful babies should take them out of the church during the sermon, or that "church dogs" should be prevented from running about in the church during the services, lest they defile the altar! That in such a context no effort should be made to define the confessional standards of the church in other than general terms should not be surprising.

13 Sven Kjällerström, "Bekännelsen i den svenska reformationskyrkan," *En bok om kyrkan* (Stockholm: SKD, 1934), pp. 200-201.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 203-209. Of this synod Bishop John Wordsworth writes, "It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the importance of this council as a turning point in the history of Sweden. . . . It stands out as evidence of what a national church may do for the people when it is allowed to have a reasonable independence. There are few if any parallels to be found to it in the religious history of mankind." *Op. cit.*, p. 261. For the text of the Uppsala beslut (decision) of 1593, see *Svenska kyrkans bekännelseskriterier*, ed. by Dick Helander (Stockholm: SKD, 1944).

15 Einar Billing, *Den svenska folkkyrkan* (Stockholm: SKS, 1930), p. 80.

16 Helander, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

ing the teaching of the church.¹⁷ The concluding phase in this development was the church law of 1686, where it was stated that the other writings in the Book of Concord were to be understood as explanations of the Augsburg Confession.¹⁸

Since 1686 three tendencies can be noted in the Church of Sweden with respect to the status of the Confessions. The first is the strictly orthodox affirmation that the entire Book of Concord is to be regarded as normative, represented in more recent times by the Schartauan clergy on the west coast of Sweden.¹⁹ The second is repeated attempts by liberals, but also low-church conservatives, to return to the decision of the Uppsala Council of 1593, according to which only the Augsburg Confession is made normative. Such efforts were partially successful in the Constitution of 1772, and wholly successful in the Constitution of 1809.²⁰ It was therefore believed almost a foregone conclusion that at the general synod of 1893, when the 300th anniversary of the Uppsala Council of 1593 was celebrated, the church law would also be changed so as to be in accord with the constitution, in which the faith of the king is defined. However, during the nineteenth century a new understanding of the Confessions had begun to develop. The Confessions were not interpreted primarily as collections of doctrinal propositions, but in their historical concreteness as means by which the church had defended or expounded its faith in critical situations. According to this view there was no question of abandoning portions of the confessional heritage of the past. Rather, this heritage could be expected to grow as new historical conditions confronted the church with new questions demanding confessional answers.

In 1893 Gottfrid Billing led the forces that pressed successfully for retaining the statement in the church law in which all the writings of the Book of Concord are acknowledged as providing the basis for the teaching of the Church of Sweden.²¹ Much of the discussion at this synod centered about the problem of the freedom of the clergy in relation to their obligation to preach and teach in accordance with the Confessions. In answer to those who called for a reduction of the number of normative symbols in the interest of greater freedom for the clergy, Billing argued that the larger the body of writings, the greater the freedom

17 *Ibid.*, p. 15. For a discussion of the "syncretistic controversy" which led to the adoption of the Book of Concord, see Sven Göransson, *Ortodoxi och synkretism i Sverige 1647-1660* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1950).

18 Helander, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

19 For a discussion of the role played by a representative of this position in connection with the synod of 1893, see Sven Kjällerström, "Domprosten Carl Olbers och den ostympade bekännelsen," in *Nordisk teologi*, pp. 248-264. In this essay a helpful historical context is outlined in terms of which the contribution of Gottfrid Billing at that same synod can be more clearly understood.

20 Holmquist, *Handbok i svensk kyrkohistoria*, II, p. 211; III, p. 8. The 1809 constitution reads as follows: "The king shall always adhere to the pure evangelical doctrine, as it is accepted and explained in the unaltered Augsburg Confession and the Uppsala Council's decision of 1593." Helander, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

21 Pleijel, "Svenska kyrkan och bekännelsen under sista halvseket," in *En bok om kyrkan*, pp. 214-219.

the Christian interpreter, for he held that the Confessions are to be viewed in their historical context and interpreted in terms of the spirit to be found within them. Rather than that one symbol should be selected and used legalistically as a standard for the doctrine of the church, all of the Confessions are to be interpreted evangelically as important historical witnesses to the Gospel.²²

More recently questions have been raised as to the authority of the Athanasian Creed. At general synods held in 1920, 1925, and 1934 motions were presented with the purpose of removing the Athanasian Creed from the symbols accepted by the Church of Sweden. In 1934 the motion, presented by Professor Emanuel Linderholm, of Uppsala, had reference not only to the Athanasian Creed, but called for the naming of a commission to determine which symbols should be retained in the Swedish church, in so far as it is to be called evangelical.²³ Thus the motion raised the question of the function and importance of the Confessions as such in the life of the church. It was to this question that Anders Nygren, delegate to the synod as professor of the theological faculty at Lund, addressed himself.²⁴ Here it is interesting to note the way in which Nygren interprets the significance of the Confessions in terms of the method of motif research.²⁵

Nygren points out that Christianity came as a new message into the world and had to struggle against competing powers. The great danger was syncretism, that Christianity in confrontation with its environment would lose its characteristic nature. Against this threat symbols and Confessions were formed. "When the church was in danger of being overwhelmed by a spirit striving against Christianity, these confessional writings—even with their historically conditioned limitations—have served as breakwaters, which halted the alien storm wave and per-

22 For Gottfrid Billings' own interpretation of the Confessions, see his introduction to *Athanska kyrkans bekännelseskriter* (Lund: Gleerups, 1895), specially pp. 2-3. At a subsequent synod in 1903 Gottfrid Billing led the church to a restatement of the ordination vow, which made possible at the same time evangelical adherence to the Gospel, which is the church's central witness, and freedom in historically and theologically searching out the exact meaning of that gospel. See Edvard Rodhe, "En blick på de trenne siste decenniernas svenska teologi," in *Svensk teologisk kvartalskrift*, 3 (1927), p. 230. The new vow reads as follows "Will you, according to your best knowledge and understanding, purely and clearly proclaim God's Word as it is given to us in the Holy Scriptures and borne witness to by the Confessions of our church?" Cf. Pleijel, "Svenska kyrkan och bekännelsen under sista halvsekleet," pp. 217-222. For a description of the circumstances which led Gottfrid Billing to press for this change in the ordination oath, see Einar Billing, *Allmänna kyrkomötets protokoll 1934* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1934), No. 7, p. 74.

23 *Allmänna kyrkomötets protokoll 1934*, No. 7, pp. 56-60.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 60-67.

25 For Nygren's own description of the method of motif research see *Agape and Eros*, trans. Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), pp. 27-244, and "Eros and Agape," in *A Handbook of Christian Theology*, Marvin Halvorson and Arthur A. Cohen, eds. (New York: Meridian, 1958), pp. 96-101. See also Bernhard Erling, *Nature and History. A Study in Theological Methodology with special Attention to Motif Research*. *Studia theologica Lundensia*, 19 (Lund: Gleerups, 1960).

mitted the Christian stream to flow further in its own channel."²⁶ Thus if one understands the literature of the time at which the Athanasian Creed was written, one recognizes how almost every statement in this document is erected as a protection and a breakwater against alien ways of salvation.²⁷ As to what Nygren means by these alien ways of salvation, he quotes I Cor. 1:23, where the preaching of Christ crucified is contrasted with the Jewish and Greek, or Gentile, ways of salvation.²⁸ Nygren insists that the Creeds have to do with the way of salvation and are not to be understood as metaphysical descriptions of the mysteries of God's nature.²⁹ It is because the way of salvation has not changed that we do not today abandon the old Confessions, even though we use the forms of expression of our own time when we are asked to state what the Christian faith is. From this point of view it becomes improper for the church to discuss again and again which Confessions are to be included among its standards.³⁰

It is not difficult to note in the foregoing discussion how the method of motif research, with its distinction between *agape*, *nomos*, and *eros* motifs, has provided the presuppositions on the basis of which Nygren confronts the problem of the interpretation of the Confessions.

Creeds and Confessions have historically had a twofold purpose. On the one hand they have rejected heretical teachings. On the other hand they have affirmed positive doctrines. Since in many cases the device used to reject heretical teachings has been a series of positive affirmations, it is difficult in some instances to determine the exact sense in which these affirmations are to be understood.³¹ In any case, however, it is evident that Confessions are intended to be normative. When it is stated that Symbols and Confessions of the church are attempts at scriptural interpretation, and thus presumably themselves subject to the norm which they seek to interpret,³² it must nonetheless be remembered that they

26 *Ibid.*, p. 62. Nygren here is quoting from a committee report on the motion, which he himself, as a member of the committee, had written.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 66. Nygren here makes the statement that a church's confessional position is determined during the period of its origin. "En kyrkas bekännelseriktning avgöres i dess uppkomstperiod." Such a statement presents some difficulties in so far as an attempt is made to apply it to both the ancient Creeds and the Confessions of the Reformation, for then it would seem that the church which confesses both of these groups of symbols has had two periods of origin. At the same time it is true that the Reformation Symbols seek only to reassert the faith affirmed in the Creeds.

31 Thus, for example, it is not clear whether the reference to the virgin birth in the Apostles' Creed is an attempt to rule out a docetic Christology by referring in scriptural language to Jesus' human birth, or whether it is intended, as Einar Molland suggests, to affirm the divinity of Christ by reference to his miraculous birth. See "De old kirkelige symboler," *Nordisk teologisk oppslagsbok* (Lund & København, 1955), Vol. II, col. 1357.

32 Edmund Schlink, *Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften* (München: Kaiser, 1948), 3rd ed., pp. 23-66, 398-422. Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, *Kirchengeschichte als Geschichte der*

aim to be normative interpretations of this scriptural norm. We seem to be caught in a logical circle at this point, for if the Scriptures can be used to judge the Confessions, it seems that the Confessions lose their authority and become part of the theological tradition of the church.³³ Yet it seems altogether necessary, not only with respect to the Scriptures, but also with respect to the theological tradition of the church, to find a way in which the essential nature of Christianity may be defined.

It is in relation to this need that the method of motif research must be understood. Here an effort has been made to develop a method by which both the negative and the positive function of the Confessions can be carried out, so that it is possible with greater clarity to define both the heretical teachings which the church rejects and the positive teachings which it affirms.³⁴ It is in relation to alternate attempts to find a solution to the problem indicated that the method of motif research is to be judged.

Auslegung der Heiligen Schrift (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1947). The view presented in these two books is to a large extent the same as the relation between Scripture and Confessions described in the foreword to the Formula of Concord.

33 It does not seem sufficient to say, as Gottfrid Billing does, that the church is convinced that her Confessions are and will remain the truth, while granting that further research may reveal further truth in the Christian revelation. *Op. cit.*, pp. 2-3. Some more concrete indication must be given as to what the "truth" which the Confessions contain is, and what relation this truth has to that which may yet be discovered.

34 In this connection Nygren's answer to the charge that he teaches that the agape motif is to be found in purer form in Luther than in the New Testament is of interest. See "Yttergåre till teologiens metodfråga," in *Svensk teologisk kvartalskrift*, 32 (1956), pp. 150-151. His answer is substantially that the historical development of Christianity at some points sharpens the formulation of the Christian message. This does not mean that the agape motif becomes "purer," but it does mean that the terminology by which it is described is more carefully chosen. An example of this principle can be found in the fact that after the Arian controversy Col. 1:15 or Prov. 8:22, in so far as they are given a Christological interpretation, can no longer be interpreted in the manner which might otherwise seem quite natural. In this connection Luther's comments on John 1:14 may also be cited. He says that the Holy Spirit here speaks in a way in which we could not speak. "Die Disputation de divinitate et humanitate Christi," *W.A.*, 39:2, pp. 93-96. Motif research may thus be viewed as an attempt to draw more sharply the contours of the Christian message, not only negatively but also positively. In motif research there is also an attempt to overcome the ambiguity which arises when the same statement is used with possibly both negative and positive intent (see above, note 31) by providing specific definitions both of the alternative ways of salvation which the Christian faith rejects and of the way of salvation which it offers.

A Short-range Ecumenical Blueprint

By GENE LUN

I FIND myself in complete agreement with those who maintain that the ecumenical movement has been blessed by the fact that a master blueprint has not been required. If our churches had not been able to come together in this way without first charting the course for years ahead, it is likely that the movement would never have progressed beyond the embryo stage. The exact shape of the movement will have to be determined as we investigate together, in a spirit of Christian love, the various possibilities which arise. It is still too early to tell what the final configuration of the movement will look like. Perhaps the form will always remain fluid to a certain degree; it is possible that this is the kind of endeavor which can never (or should never) be "finalized" in this world. A too precise condition may prove confining and debilitating. This has been true in other movements where spontaneity and élan are more important than precision and beauty of form.

It was Pastor Martin Niemoeller who asked about the ecumenical movement at Amsterdam in 1948, "Did we kill it or reconsecrate it?" (i.e. through the organization of the World Council of Churches). It is possible that too much emphasis on organization, too many plans, a superfluity of bureaucrats, etc. could exert a pernicious effect upon a movement of this kind. This danger must not be forgotten. It goes without saying that informality alone will not keep the movement vital, and we would not want to see everything related to it placed on an *ad hoc* basis in perpetuity. But lest we be tempted to go too far in the other direction, let us not forget that the ecumenical movement is, after all, a voluntary association in which even subtle forms of coercion will not be tolerated. Furthermore, if we desire to have the cooperation of the Holy Spirit in working out "the great new fact of our time," we must be sure to give him plenty of room in which to function. We must be content to think his thoughts after him; we must not presume to think for him.

All of the foregoing has been set down with deep conviction. At the same time, however, I also feel strongly about this, that we must now begin to wax more specific about the goals toward which we are working. As it appears to me, more and more people, deeply interested in the ecumenical movement and seriously concerned about its future, are beginning to be troubled by this very problem. What are we striving for exactly? What can we do to exhibit in concrete terms our desire for church union? Much of the enthusiasm which the movement still elicits will, I fear, be dissipated unnecessarily unless some definite program is set forth, complete with tangible, practical, and reachable objectives. Christian

ity is a reality even when it is neither recognized nor appreciated. But this noble ideal must be expressed objectively too, in as many ways as possible, and high-level discussions among professors and prelates, it must be confessed, are not sufficient to satisfy the longing of the rank and file. The long-range, "master" blueprint is still unnecessary (and indeed, impossible); but the more modest, short-range blueprints, capable of fruition in the foreseeable future, become increasingly desirable with every year which separates us from Edinburgh 1910.

It is against this background that I submit the following recommendation. This is not new; it has already been tried, sometimes successfully, at other times not. But if given the priority which it deserves, and recognizing the grave need which it is designed to serve, this plan could do much, I believe, to rescue the good ship "Dikumene" from the becalmed seas in which it is now floundering. The plan which I have in mind is the familiar "family" plan, which recognizes at this time the valid presence of the several denominational families in the Protestant world and insists that these families ought to be united (or reunited) as the basis for a more effective witness in the world. This would not have to be done on an international basis, I believe; it would be sufficient in most cases to do this on a national basis in the various countries of Christendom. Here in the United States, for example, those of us who are concerned about this would continue to work to organize one Lutheran Church, one Methodist Church, one Presbyterian Church, and so on. This plan is probably too idealistic in some cases; in others the goal is largely reached already.

The alternative to this necessitates the crossing of denominational lines. This has been done in some cases, and not without a modicum of success. The Church of South India, now in its fourteenth year, is probably the best known example. But while much may be gained in taking such bold steps, it is also possible, at this time, that much that is good may be dissipated in the same process. There is reason to believe that the Church of Canada is bigger but not otherwise better than its component churches were in the previous incarnation (pre-1925). All of us are conditioned by the historical traditions in which our own denominational family shares. And in view of the fact that many of these traditions are now hundreds of years old, it is fairly easy to see how complications can arise when lines are crossed. If interconfessional mergers are to succeed, it is almost inevitable that emasculation precede or at least accompany homogenization. The criticisms which I have heard about the United Church of Canada have indicated just such a watering down of some of the fundamentals. After the ecumenical movement has been in force for a longer time, dulling the rough edges of competing traditions and sublimating the many "memories which mount guard," interconfessional mergers may be accomplished with greater ease and with greater hopes of success. But as of now it appears that intraconfessional mergers are most logically ordered by the ecumenical sequence. These can be entered into now with very real hopes of success (examples abound on every hand), and in so far as they succeed these

mergers will certainly influence the ecclesiastical atmosphere and more than likely prepare the way for more inclusive church union in the years to come.

The current Blake proposal for a four-church merger across denominational lines, broached at the last convention of the National Council of Churches and much ballyhooed since, is, to say the least, an interesting trial balloon. Its fate will be watched with fascination and concern. But is this really a good idea at this time? Would it not be better, for example, for the Presbyterians to close their own ranks first? American Presbyterianism has been divided since before the Civil War, far too long for such a homogeneous group. Efforts to create a completely united Presbyterian Church in this country ought to go on without interruption. But what precisely would be gained by merging a part of the Presbyterian Church with other non-Presbyterian groups? The Calvinist influence is by all means a desirable component in the total church, and I submit that this influence would be exerted most effectively among us through the agency of a completely united Presbyterian Church. Furthermore, I am convinced that the Episcopalians, too, can best make their unique contribution to the totality of American Christianity as a distinct group. In a very real sense, the Anglican influence is needed in all parts of Christendom, not least of all because it serves to remind Protestants of their Catholic past. For the American branch to become quasi-Presbyterian would, I believe, be a real loss. Perhaps the stated clerk of the United Presbyterian Church was inspired (in part) by the Holy Spirit when he drafted his plan, but the "family" plan, while perhaps less daring and dramatic, appeals to me as being more prudential at the present time. One cannot fly in the face of hard facts, and ecclesiastical facts usually come quite firm.

But can this be done? Can our denominational families come together? These questions, it seems to me, are best answered by another question, imbedded (all too securely) in the study document of the 1957 Lutheran World Federation assembly: "Can churches with the same Confession take it upon themselves not to be in church fellowship?" What continued justification is there for such divisions? Reasons, of course, are cited, some of which are "historically valid," to be sure. But are they theologically valid? Are they tenable in the light of the present crucial situation? The church of Christ is fighting for its life in many parts of the world today, and in nations such as our own it is not making the impact that it should. In view of this, can we afford the luxury of badly divided denominational families, a situation which is obviously dissipating many of our precious resources? Can we not objectify the oneness of the church of Christ at least on the denominational level? This is my plan; this is my plea.

It is possible, I realize, that something may be lost in the implementation of this plan. Some of the efficiency of our smaller units may be sacrificed, for example. In the work of the church, however, effectiveness is more important than efficiency, and I am convinced that united denominations would make a greater impact upon society than is presently the case. And even more important, perhaps, is the fact that this is a blueprint for ecumenical action. This is a goal that the

nk and file can visualize and work for, and given the proper leadership this task could be accomplished in many instances. I feel that this must be stated categorically: *We must do something!* Moreover, we must launch a project that will excite and involve the laity. The "family" plan is one possibility. Much of the work is already done; enough remains, in most cases, to give us sufficient scope for additional energizing effort.

It is understood, of course, that ecumenical agencies are loath to come in and place their official weight behind merger negotiations. This reticence is logical. As said, external pressures are not usually appreciated in ecclesiastical movements. As a result, the proposal set forth in this paper could not, in all likelihood, become the stated principle of any of the ecumenical agencies. But this need not be the cause for despair. On the other hand, this serves to remind us that the leverage needed to implement this plan must come from within the churches themselves, from officials, pastors, and laymen. And that is precisely what we need and want. The leadership of the ecumenical movement has probably done about all that it can do for the cause up to the present time. At this juncture others must grasp the baton more firmly; the necessary new developments must arise from the lower echelons. The "family" plan is designed to serve such a need.

Enough interested members of enough Protestant churches adopted a plan of this kind, and strove to promote it wherever and however possible, I am convinced that this could give the ecumenical movement the "lift" that it so badly needs at the present time.

Correspondence and Comment

REFLECTIONS ON THE PLACE OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY

First I must express my appreciation for Dr. Bergendoff's essay on a subject of importance in the February number of the *QUARTERLY*. I found much in it of value. But, having said this, I wish to raise one objection and then pose three questions.

The objection is of an historical nature. In looking for the cause of the modern suspicion of theology as a body of knowledge, Dr. Bergendoff denies John Henry Newman's charge that it is to be found in the Reformation. Rather, he claims, the cause lies principally "in the philosophy of Descartes, who first severed truth into two parts, reserving for the physical, the material, the measurable the claim of being the substance of knowledge."¹

Even discounting the fact that a theory of two truths was present in medieval times, this is a strange claim. So to characterize the philosophy of Descartes is to characterize it as a somewhat dogmatic form of empiricism. Surely this is hardly correct. Almost at random I picked two passages from the *Meditations* which stand opposed to this interpretation.

I see clearly that there is nothing easier for me to understand than my mind.²

In these last few days I have become so accustomed to ignoring my senses, and I have so carefully noticed that we know very little with certainty about corporeal things and that we know much more about God himself,

that it is easy for me now to turn my consideration from picturable things to those which, being wholly dissociated with matter, are purely intelligible. And certainly my idea of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking being, not extended in length, breadth, and depth, and participating in none of the qualities of body, is incomparably more distinct than my idea of anything corporeal.³

Undoubtedly the causes of such doubt about the noetic status of theology are many and varied. But if one looks to philosophy as a partial cause, the name of David Hume must surely rank higher on the list than that of Descartes. It is his combination of empiricism and scepticism which sets the dominant mood of today's university. (Like most generalizations, this is literally false, though suggestive.)⁴

Now to the questions, which I consider more important than the objection.

First. It is claimed that theology ought to be included in the university curriculum on the ground that it is a branch of human knowledge, a science. Question: What are the criteria of

1 Conrad Bergendoff, "Theology, the Church, and the University," in *THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY*, February, 1961, p. 5.

2 Rene Descartes, *Meditations* (The Liberal Arts Press, 1951), p. 30.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 47.

4 An even more suggestive line of thought is that the university has so completely accepted the idea that absolute truth is unattainable (all laws are approximations) that it looks with suspicion upon any dogmatic claim to know "the Truth."

knowledge under which theology qualifies as a science?

Dr. Bergendoff argues that the modern university has "by its exclusion of theology taken sides in a controversy to the meaning of knowledge, and admits only such knowledge as befits a metaphysical distinction of what is known."⁵ But surely a university *must* take sides on the question of knowledge. It *must* have criteria, standards. Unless it does, it will scarcely be able to deny admittance to alchemy, black magic, and astrology.

Very roughly, criteria for a science in a modern university include at least the following: (1) it must be public; (2) it must be supported by evidence; (3) it must be intersubjectively verifiable, i.e., at least in principle anyone can collect the evidence and make the reasonings for himself; (4) it must be falsifiable.

If theology satisfies such criteria, this should be shown. If such criteria are defective, this should be shown. Theologians must pay much more critical attention to the problem of knowledge than they have. It will not do just to shout somewhat loudly that theology is also a science; it must be shown to be so. A beginning might be made if theologians were seriously to ask themselves a question such as this: "Why is theology a science and astrology not?"⁶

Second. Even if one accepts the thesis that theology is knowledge, the question remains, "Knowledge of what?" Thomas Aquinas was quite certain of the answer to that. It seems that our modern theologians are not so sure. Of God? Of man's religious

consciousness? Of faith? Or do we mean by theology merely the study of the Bible and the history of the church?

Dr. Bergendoff makes a necessary distinction between the teaching of theology and the preaching of the Gospel. Then he goes on: "In the teaching of religion the faculty member presents objectively the place of man's faith in human life and the effects of the church in the history of mankind. This is the 'science' of theology which earns it a place in the university."⁷

One is moved to ask whether there is anything in this description which could not be covered by a combination of psychology of religion, sociology of religion, history of religion, a study of religion in the arts, and an analytic philosophy of religion. If not, it seems that the job of theology as a "science" can be done by already existing university departments (which is not to say it *is* being done). If, however, this description of theology does *not* exhaust it, the question remains. What is it that theology is knowledge of?

Third. Dr. Bergendoff acutely examines the problem of religious di-

5 Bergendoff, *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

6 A too easy answer to this question might suggest itself: Christian theology is *true* and astrology is not. But it should be borne in mind that what distinguishes a science is method, not results. There is much truth in common sense, but it is not for all that a science. And we are fairly sure that a portion of contemporary physics will in time be shown to be false, but this makes physics none the less a science. It is conceivable that on this score biblical criticism will pass muster and systematic theology will not.

7 Bergendoff, *loc. cit.*, p. 16.

vision in relation to the teaching of theology in a university. He concludes that both Protestant and Catholic theology should be represented. Question: If these theologies are admitted, by what right does the university close its doors to Jewish theology? And if that

is admitted, surely Mohammedan, Hindu, and Buddhist theologies ought to be given an equal voice. The Western university is in no position to prejudge the scientific status or the truth of any of these.

NORMAN MELCHERT

Book Reviews and Notices¹

The New English Bible, New Testament.
New York: Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, 1961. 447 pages. \$4.95.

This much-heralded publication by British scholars has already received thorough review both in religious journals and in the secular press, and the story behind its production is thus presently well known. We shall not therefore presume to re-state it here. While not all of the reviews have been uncritical, generally speaking this first half of *The New English Bible* (the Old Testament is to appear later) has been hailed and extolled for its freshness and clarity. Any reader of it will readily understand why such plaudits have been forthcoming. As a "meaning by meaning" rather than a "word for word" translation, as the British scholar F. F. Bruce has correctly adjudged it, this new version of the New Testament frequently presents familiar passages with a new twist which underscores their message as other versions do not. Examples are of course legion. We cite but two, selected at random, to illustrate the point. "Master, requite thy disciples" (KJV, Luke 19:39), e.g., becomes, "Master, reprimand your disciples," in this translation—a turn of phraseology which is not only fresh to the modern ear but which also clarifies the real meaning of the Greek word *epitimēson* in this particular context. More striking, however, is this one from I Cor. 10:5. In the KJV it reads, "But with many of them God was not well pleased: for they were overthrown in the wilderness." The British scholars have translated the same passage thus, "And yet, most of them were not accepted by God, for the desert was strewn with their corpses." Here in this second example it is most clear that meaning occupied the attention of the translators more than desire to produce a rigid word by word rendition.

While this approach has won the translators much praise, it has also brought crit-

icism, for not all readers and reviewers have agreed with the meanings thus set forth. The present reviewer will cite some of his own criticisms at a later point.

At the outset certain general observations may be made about the translation before attention is given to details. Without doubt the gospels and the Acts of the Apostles come off best in this version. The translations of the Greek texts here are most poignant. In a masterful and beautiful style of English such as only the British can produce, the story of Jesus and of his church unfolds in narratives and in speech so as to make the ancient documents read as products of our own century. Gone are the Elizabethan archaisms which in other versions made Jesus and those who surrounded him appear somewhat unreal. Without employing slang and without sacrificing a justified reverence for the material before them, the translators have infused both the story and the figures with reality and with life in a way which must be commended.

Most of the letters fare nearly as well with the possible exceptions of Romans and Hebrews. The sustained arguments of these two important theological documents demand the same careful and undivided attention of the reader in this translation as they do when they are read in the original Greek or in other English versions. The subject matter simply precludes any easy reading. But the balance of the epistolary books, including Ephesians, which in the Greek contains long and involved sentences, are beautifully and satisfactorily done on the whole.

With the possible exception of the introductory letters to the seven churches (Rev. 1:4-4:22), the Revelation of John will doubtless remain, even in this fine translation, an enigma to most laymen. The difficulties of

1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

the book's apocalyptic terminology and scenery are not overcome by the fact that the Greek text here has been rendered into fine English. A good commentary on the Apocalypse will be as necessary to the understanding of this obscure document now as it has always been.

In turning next to details, we note first that the elements of both compromise and of manuscript variations have left their marks upon the work. Translations preferred by the minority among the translators are everywhere acknowledged in footnotes where they are introduced by the word "*Or.*" In the opinion of this reviewer these minority preferences are often more acceptable than the choices finally adopted for the text proper. One striking example is John 1:3, 4. The finished text reads: "no single thing was created without him. All that came to be was alive with his life," etc. Far better, it would appear, is the text placed in the footnote: "no single created thing came into being without him. There was life in him," etc. This translation surely is closer to the real meaning of the Greek text.

As is perhaps true of any work of this kind, there are quite a number of individual passages which might be brought into question. It is impossible to list all of them here. More appear (in my opinion) in the Gospel of John than elsewhere. In addition to the one mentioned in the above paragraph, the following other questionable Johannine verses ought to be checked by the reader: John 2:4; 2:23; 5:29; 8:46; 9:4; 13:8; 18:4; and I John 1:1 ff. In the last mentioned passage the masculine "he" would better translate the Greek than does the misleading "it" adopted by the translators. Two examples from Matthew might also be noted. The first is the questionable translation of the verb *ēggiken* in Matt. 3:2. Literally the text reads that "the kingdom of heaven *has approached*." In this version it is rendered, "the kingdom of heaven *is upon you*." The terminology is ambiguous. One may see here the influence of C. H. Dodd, who directed the translation. Overtones of his "realized eschatology" and of his peculiar interpretation of *ēggiken* as meaning "has come" are here present. Second, Matt. 16:25b, where

the Greek reads, "and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it," is rendered, "but if a man will let himself be lost for my sake, he will find his true self." It is the finding of one's "true self" which is here objectionable. The Greek does not suggest that the "true self" is found, but rather one's *life*. One wonders if modern existential thinking edged into the picture at this point to influence the terminology chosen. If it has, there is a real question about the legitimacy of the finished product.

The work further abounds in "Britishisms," some of which are most colorful. Take, for example, "as the days mounted up" in Acts 9:23, and "why are you trying to catch me out?" in Matt. 22:18. Few of these British turns of phrase will puzzle American readers, but some will. What average American, for instance, will readily understand what is meant by such terms as these: "furlongs" (Matt. 14:24); "midge" (Matt. 23:24); "condol" (John 11:20, 31); and "batten on her flesh" (Rev. 17:17)? The dictionary will have to come down from the shelf if passages where such words are employed will be understood. Fortunately "Britishisms" like these are comparatively few in number and thus will not mar the translation for the reading public on this side of the Atlantic.

Finally we might draw attention to the following features which will interest New Testament scholars and exegetes. (1) Frequently the term *ho Christos* in the Greek text is translated "the Messiah"—a treatment which correctly illuminates the messianic orientation of the whole New Testament. (2) Mark 16:9-20, the longer ending which appears in some manuscripts, is not footnoted as in the RSV. Rather it appears in full print after a break in the text into which the shorter ending of other manuscripts is separately inserted. (3) John 7:53-8-11 has been removed from the text proper with an explanatory footnote in its place, and it is printed on a separate page at the end of the Fourth Gospel. (4) In Rom. 5:1 the translators have adopted the subjunctive form of *echomen* and have placed the indicative form in a footnote. (5) In the disputed passage in I Cor. 7:36 ff. a division of opinion among

translators is evident. The term *parthenon* in the text proper translated as "partner celibacy." In line with this, 7:36b has "let them marry," and 7:38a has "he who marries a partner does well." The minority opinion acknowledged in the footnote. There *parthenon* is rendered (accurately, I think) as "virgin daughter (or ward)." In line with footnoted 7:36b then has "let the girl and her lover marry," and footnoted 7:38a states that he who "gives his daughter in marriage" does well. Finally (6), by the title given on page 328, the translators have attributed the Ephesian epistle to Paul.

The reviewer acknowledges that these few observations about details in the translation are by no means exhaustive. They are at best only typical of what can be said after study of this new version. They also indicate even in their brevity the fact that any careful reader is apt to find this translation both exciting and exasperating, both satisfying and jarring.

It is because of the exasperating and jarring qualities which appear in the translation here and there that it should seem inadvisable for the clergy to adopt the volume in its present form forthwith and read it freely at services of worship. In places the translation presents some real problems—some of them theological. Nevertheless, the pastor may do well to preach from the text where glaring problems do not exist, and to study the work carefully. Certainly any student of the New Testament should henceforth be well acquainted with this monumental publication, for it cannot but be helpful in exegesis.

ROBERT A. BARTELS

Jesus of Nazareth. By Gunther Bornkamm. Translated by Irene and Fraser McLuskey with James Robinson. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 239 pages. \$4.00.

Bornkamm has given us a life of Jesus written in a style to appeal both to the layman and the trained theologian. Those who look for a "life" in the traditional pattern based on an uncritical acceptance of the synoptic record as it stands will be disappointed. So will those who want a "sci-

entific" chronological account after the fashion of Goguel's *La Vie de Jesus*, a constructive account based on an assured minimum of historical fact. Bornkamm rejects both the proposition that the aim of Synoptic criticism is to determine "what actually happened" and the unqualified acceptance of the tradition as it now stands.

Bornkamm seeks rather to elucidate the revelation which is comprised of both history and interpretation. He understands very well that the difficulty in appraising the Synoptic record is that Jesus is not merely a figure of the past but the risen Lord: any record of his life is necessarily colored by the experience of him as dynamically present. Hence "the tradition is not really the repetition and transmission of the word he spoke once upon a time, but rather *is* his word today" (p. 17). Together these two elements constitute the revelation of God.

In contrast to the radical skepticism which will not admit that it is possible to know anything about the historical Jesus, Bornkamm believes that the Gospels contain historical fact; and he believes it is the necessary task of criticism to recover the authentic history of Jesus. The Gospels and their history constitute a rejection of myth. Christian faith does not begin with itself but lives from past history. Furthermore, the Gospels are the rejection of a purely futuristic understanding of faith which would deny the present order. Faith can be nothing other than following the Christ who is yet to face the cross and resurrection.

This does not mean, of course, the return to historicism. The chronological sequence found in the Gospels, for example, is secondary. The Gospels are composed of individual pericopes, each of which contains the entire person and history of Jesus. Each is self-contained; and this is true also for the words of Jesus. In precisely these individual bits of tradition the uniqueness of Jesus is set forth, that is, contains history.

A glance at the outline of the book chapter by chapter reveals the advance over historical skepticism. Although two long chapters in the center of the book are devoted to the teaching of Jesus, following Bultmann's emphasis on Jesus the Word, never-

theless, there is a chapter on "Period and Environment" and a rudimentary biography in "Jesus of Nazareth." In this latter chapter it is suggested that there was in the historical Jesus at least a preliminary encounter with the Christ as preached by the early Christians. No doubt this confrontation occurred primarily in the teaching of Jesus; nevertheless, Bornkamm shows here a willingness to ask the question as to the meaning of the history of Jesus for faith.

Then follows the central portion dealing with Jesus' teaching: "The Dawn of the Kingdom of God" and "The Will of God." The question of the historical Jesus recurs in the closing chapters on "Discipleship," "Jesus' Journey to Jerusalem, Suffering and Death," "The Messianic Question," and "Jesus Christ," the latter dealing with Jesus' resurrection and the faith of the church.

Three appendices on the Synoptic Problem, the Sermon on the Mount, and the messianic titles in the tradition reinforce Bornkamm's emphasis on the significance of the theology of the early church in shaping the tradition and the deep interrelationship between the revelation of God in Jesus' life and the revelation in the ongoing life of the church. Throughout is evident the seriousness of the new quest for the historical Jesus in whose preaching and actions God was present to save.

No review can do justice to the clarity and power of Bornkamm's presentation. This significant book itself reflects the immediacy which it claims was the essential fact about the Jesus of history.

LEROY NORQUIST

The Powers That Be: Earthly Powers and Demonic Rulers in Romans 13:1-7. By Clinton Morrison (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 29). Naperville, Illinois: Allenson, 1960. 144 pages. \$2.25 (Paper).

This is a most interesting and helpful essay. In it, Mr. Morrison attempts to exegete the famous words of Paul in Romans 13:1-7: "Let every person be subject to the governing authority (*exousiai*). For there is no authority (*exousia*) except from God, and those that exist have been instituted

by God. . . ." Morrison remarks that this proclamation certainly needs clarification in our day, when so much has been written of "demonic" states and of the dilemma of Christians (such as those who lived under Hitler) who know not whether to remain faithful to the state or to resist it because it had rebelled against God. Essentially, his mode of study is this: He begins by assuming the point of view of Dibelius, Cullmann, and Barth that states that the spirit world ("the principalities and powers") is a highly significant part of Paul's thought. This means that the Christian's subjection to the "powers" is a subjection to the "spiritual powers" behind the state as well as to the civil authorities themselves. This viewpoint is expounded in Chapter I without criticism. In Chapter II Morrison gives "The Negative Reaction," the criticisms of Barth and Cullmann written by Brunner, Bultmann, Hans von Campenhausen, etc. This criticism tends to prove that *exousia* does *not* refer to "spiritual powers" in Rom. 13 at all, but only to civil authorities. This is borne out by consulting a lexicon.

In Chapter III Morrison evaluates the positions of the affirmative and negative arguments and states that while the contenders agree on all else in the passage they are fundamentally divided on the meaning of *exousia*. Hence he proposes a new approach of his own to attempt to understand what Rom. 13 meant to those who received the letter at Rome. Chapter IV is an exegetical contribution of the author toward the interpretation of the problem. He makes a very good case for our need to understand Paul's letters as communications. He concludes that for the Jew, Christian, and pagan of the first century *exousia* was inseparably linked to the cosmic world view that saw "spiritual powers" standing behind governmental powers. Hence Paul must have meant for Christians to be subject to the spiritual as well as the political powers that be.

In Chapter V Morrison follows up his new approach by suggesting that Aulen and other commentators who stress Christ's victory over the *exousia* are making more of Paul's words than they will bear. He decisively points out that the "powers" are sub-

to Christ because they were created through him (Col. 1:17, 2:10), but that Christ has not "converted" them to use them in his kingdom. Thus he distinguishes between the realm of Christ's lordship over the powers, which is the church, the fellowship of those who believe, and not principalities and powers. The state, under its spiritual principalities and powers, has an idea of freedom, in the providence of God, in order to maintain order and law among men. Because this is so, the Christian, free of all but subject (voluntarily) to all, respects and obeys the state. The church needs the state to preserve order in the world so that it may go about its work of salvation. Hence the church should not despise the state or its rulers, and not lightly declare a state to have become "demonic," because no state can ever become "Christian." There do come times when the Christian must disobey the evil orders of a state, but such civil disobedience is never meritorious, nor is it to be courted. Rather, it is to be avoided as far as possible and suffered silently if there is no other recourse.

JOHN C. COOPER

Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition. By John Courtney Murray. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. 336 pages. \$5.00.

This is without doubt a significant work. It is significant because it is the first book by one of America's foremost Catholic theologians. And it is a good book, even though it consists of reprinted essays. The writing is lucid and urbane and polished. The man, Jesuit and professor of Theology at Woodstock College, Maryland, is vastly learned and sharply perceptive. What is more, he is thoroughly Roman Catholic and entirely at home in America. Non-Catholics must take him quite seriously.

It is significant because of its message—both what is said and what is implied. Father Murray's main point, convincingly made, is that America's Catholics can wholeheartedly accept and support "the American Proposition." He implies that only Catholics really can do so today, since they alone subscribe

to the idea of natural law as it came forth from the Middle Ages. His whole argument and his confident manner also imply a new aggressiveness on the part of Catholics in entering boldly into the great debates in America which seek to develop a public consensus. He does not hesitate to assert that there will be no American consensus unless we return to the Catholic understanding of natural law, which is, of course, the only understanding of natural law to which a truly reasonable person can come.

It is a significant work when many American Protestants eagerly seek dialogue with Roman Catholics. It shows that a Roman Catholic theologian is willing and able to step onto the public forum. But it is also a significant indication that he does not expect to meet Protestants on that forum.

Author Murray does not once take a serious look at Protestants in this book. He summarizes the history of moral theory in America by distinguishing an old voluntarist, fundamentalist, individualist morality and a new situationalism that never distinguishes right and wrong but simply ends in ambiguity. Only later does he admit that these are Protestant positions. His debate is with secularists and European Catholics. His enemy is Communism. He summarizes the thought of many a modern spokesman, but never that of a spokesman for Protestantism.

Furthermore, he takes several quick tours of history, moving easily from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century without ever mentioning the influence of Protestantism or noting the impact of the Reformation.

This gap in Father Murray's discussion is surely conscious and purposeful. He is not ignorant of Protestantism and has not avoided debate with Protestant spokesmen. But evidently when he takes the public rostrum he counts Protestants out. Roman Catholics have done this before. But it does make Protestant-Catholic dialogue difficult!

There are other distressing features of Father Murray's reading of history. For him a century of American resistance to giving tax money for parochial schools comes under the heading of simple Protestant prejudice. (Incidentally, his argument that a pluralist

America will have to have more than one public school system is a hard one to counter.) He seems to assume that in the genial Middle Ages the "liberal tradition" was dominant, calls Aquinas the first Whig, and states more than once that the Middle Ages recognized the right and power of the people to judge the prince. He tries to draw the principles of the American Republic directly from the Middle Ages. John Locke gets no credit for influencing America but is condemned for leading France astray. Murray registers surprise (labeling it irony) that the natural law tradition functioned in healthy fashion in America but failed to keep Catholic Europe from violent and arbitrary rule. He ignores the obvious explanation, namely, the shaping influence of Protestantism on the Anglo-American tradition, both in freeing politics from ecclesiastical interference and in bringing religious convictions to support the budding movement toward liberal democracy. He is much concerned for the practical effect of doctrines, but never faces the Roman Church as an institution with a particular kind of history.

I repeat: this is a significant book. Study it. These criticisms are simply aimed at illustrating how great is the distance separating the Roman Catholic and the Protestant perspective.

Father Murray has wise words concerning modern war. His judgments about Russian Communism are bold (though I cannot be certain of their correctness—he is sure that Communist actions always rigidly reflect Communist doctrines). He is adept at puncturing a variety of modern secularist illusions. And he always hurls his lances and thrusts his pins with disarming charm. There will surely be a Protestant amen for his plea that Americans come to grips with fundamental truths and cultivate carefully a politico-moral science in this nation.

Unfortunately, the Protestant reader will put down this book feeling that Murray has tried to kick Protestantism out of sight under the table.

FREDERICK K. WENTZ

The Theological Foundation of Law. By Jacques Ellul. Translated from the French by Marguerite Wieser. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960. 140 pages. \$3.95.

Jacques Ellul is a professor of law at the University of Bordeaux. This book is a translation of *Le Fondement Theologique du Droit* which was published in France in 1946. In so far as it cites sources, especially theological and legal, they are of that same period. One wonders a little, if the book were worth translating, why it also would not have been worth a revision before translation. Professor Ellul is an active scholar and writer, and like so many French professors he is not at all abashed at being an earnest dilettante; for this book, though ostensibly within his field of competence, is but one of more than a half-dozen which together show that Professor Ellul is both brash and brave.

Monsieur Ellul is a convert to Christian faith, and this after harrowing days with the French resistance movement during World War II. Another book already translated (1951), *The Presence of the Kingdom*, shows how immediate and intense the author's apprehension of Christian things is. He speaks out of very commanding concerns, and he is restless for the reader's conviction too. Thus there is little of academic calm and benign poise about his literature. Without the mediation of detailed argument and scholarly apparatus (typical, say, of most scholars, and especially Germans) Professor Ellul moves with esprit and eclat to whatever arouses his protesting and Christian conscience.

Nonetheless, the volume under consideration is a decided disappointment. The author is clearly irked by the Christians who make their faith relevant to legal language and practice by reviving the doctrines of natural law. With most of the *literati* who are also religious, the great cry is for relevance. But Catholic and Protestant versions of natural law are deemed faulty. The author proposes, instead, a theological foundation which is discernible, he seems to say, not in the heart of man nor in the way things really are but

ly in the pages of Scripture. Thus, with allie enthusiasm and enthusiastic dissent, Professor Ellul flails the concept of natural law with a variety of *obiter dicta* and goes to detect a theological warrant with an armory array of *obiter leget aut scribet*.

The confusing and unclear part of this book is the main theme. Professor Ellul establishes one view and establishes another without ever making explicit what he is up to. Not only is the history of natural law a mare's nest of confusions, but its "foundations" and theological, besides—are positively a lobby trap for the intellectually unwary. Because the author never tells us what his problem is, there seems to be no way to judge his success in resolving it. How does he recognize "foundations"? What kind of problem is this? Sometimes I must speak about something or other and it is appropriate for him to ask, "Why did you say that?" Is the answer a "foundation"? From Professor Ellul's numerous quotations from Holy Writ I gather that he with many Christians wants to use the Bible in this manner. However, theology seems to him to be more than telling Christians that they must stick to the Scripture; but what more it is, and especially in respect to "foundations," the author does not say.

For example, we all can recognize differences between reasons for doing something and reasons for saying something. Most people recognize situations where, if you say one thing, then you ought to say another. Logical antecedents are like that, but I do not know if anyone wants to call antecedents "foundations." Mostly we build on foundations and we do sing, if not say, something about being built on a rock. Certainly there is a way to understand that. What are there theological foundations? What do we build on them? Is understanding always built on something?

It may be true that some people believe in teachings of the Bible. Also, some people obey laws. Professor Ellul seems to think that laws and the Bible are linked up very intimately, but not as suggested by the words "laws" and "Bible." It seems that the presence of the law creates a question—about foundations—and the natural law answer is

wrong. The Bible talks about God, about justice, righteousness, and a host of other things; but with zealous charm the author generalizes all of these into the language about foundations. I think he is wrong on two counts: (1) that law needs foundations, and (2) that the Bible gives us foundations. These seem to me to be wrong because the issue of "foundations" is never made clear.

Some of the difficulties I have encountered may inhere in the translation. Even though the translation is awkward and inadequate, the greatest difficulties are not there. The French original, which I have only partly perused, is elliptical and opaque too. It seems to me that the serious difficulties inhere in the concepts themselves, not in what is said about them. Neither the concept of natural law nor the concept of foundations seems to refer to anything or to do anything. Without telling us about these a book has nowhere to go.

PAUL L. HOLMER

The Lutheran Church among Norwegian-Americans. By E. Clifford Nelson and Eugene L. Fevold. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1960. 800 pages. 2 vols. \$12.50.

Before the Evangelical Lutheran Church relinquished its corporate identity to become a part of the newly merged American Lutheran Church, its Board of Publication decided to issue "a documented history of the church." In response to the Board's invitation to prepare such a study, Professors E. Clifford Nelson and Eugene L. Fevold collaborated to produce this excellent critical account of Norwegian-American Lutheranism in two volumes.

The authors were well equipped to undertake this assignment since each man had written his doctoral dissertation in this general field. Nelson's thesis at Yale dealt with the union movements among the Norwegians from 1880 to 1917; Fevold's study at the University of Chicago traced the chief developments from 1870 to 1890. With these basic materials well in hand, the writers have proceeded to tell their up-dated story with discernment and literary skill.

Among the Norwegians, as among all

other Lutheran groups in America, the developments that have occurred in this country have been deeply informed by European antecedents. The American story of any Lutheran body is almost incomprehensible without some knowledge of this European context. Volume I, which deals with the period from 1825 to 1890, therefore begins with an account of the religious situation prevailing in Norway during the nineteenth century. The evangelical revivals that swept through Scandinavia from 1800 to 1870 affected Norway much as they did Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. Differences of practical outlook and theological viewpoint emerged, each with its own champion and spokesman, and each created within the national church its own dissident group of confessors. Hence the rise of Hauge, Hersleb, Stenersen, and Gisle Johnson. The relationships between these religious strains and their chief characteristics and attitudes toward each other and toward the national church are set forth by Dr. Fevold clearly and in balanced perspective. Although the author gives a brief sketch of the profound social and political changes which were transforming the life of the Norwegian nation during the nineteenth century, he might well have noted that the integrating factor which related the religious movements with the cultural and political trends of the day was the strong emphasis upon individualism which was common to the total modernizing spirit of nineteenth century Scandinavia.

The remaining sections of Volume I set forth the story of the transplanting to American soil of the various strains of Norwegian Lutheranism, the organization of the first synods, and the theological clarification which emerged out of the heat of battle and debate. As this part of the chronicle unfolds, the reader is left with the unmistakable impression that these Norwegians represented a particularly belligerent type of Lutheran. The smoke of battle hangs heavy over these chapters and much of Volume II, almost obscuring the much more significant fact that these Norsemen, competing, debating, and battling among themselves, yet accomplished an outstanding job of gathering their countrymen into the fold of the church.

In his preface to Volume II, Nelson declares, "It cannot be gainsaid that the witness of the Spirit has often been corroded and frustrated by the perversion and parochialism of God's people among the Norwegian-American Lutherans" (p. viii). While this may very well be true, the further fact remains that it was through the clash of viewpoint and personality that ultimate clarification of theology and practice emerged, which in turn became the matrix of creative realignments and organic mergers.

In his approach to this twentieth century development Nelson assumes what he calls a position of "controlled involvement" (which apparently means an objective attitude in the confession of sins). This does not, however, rescue the author from a rather obvious bias as he presents a viewpoint which is consistently slanted in favor of the moderate "Erlangen" wing and critical of those who espouse "repristination theology." Indeed, Nelson sees most of the more recent and significant realignments involving Norwegian Lutherans in America as being motivated chiefly by a concern to preserve this type of orthodox fundamentalism.

Let it be said, however, that to write a denominational history is a risky and often a thankless business, since any vantage point the author may take is always open to the charge of being too polite (for good or bad reasons) and therefore uncritical, or of being too subjectively slanted and therefore unfair. Nevertheless, Fevold and Nelson have rendered a real service, not only to their own branch of the church, but to the entire body of American Lutheranism, by pointing out with uncompromising honesty where the lines of cleavage actually lie. Any further achievements in Lutheran unity in America must begin with an equally honest appraisal of the real issues which now divide our household of faith.

G. EVERETT ARDEN

Luther and the Lutheran Church, 1483-1960.

By Altman K. Swihart. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. 703 pages. \$7.50.

The author of this book, who is professor of Religion at Carthage (Illinois) College,

attempts something which has not been previously brought into the compass of one book. He tells the story of Martin Luther, gives an exposition of his doctrines, discusses the history of the Lutheran Church in Europe and America, surveys Lutheran polity, liturgy, contemporary theological tendencies, and the movement toward church unity and union. In the Preface the author admits this is an "ambitious plan." Indeed it is, and he should be congratulated for entertaining such a bold and broad-gauged idea. But entertaining an idea and carrying it through successfully are two different things. Actually his book illustrates the danger of biting off a chunk too big to chew.

Fortunately, the book gets off to a fairly good start. The first two chapters ("Luther" and "The Teachings of Luther") deal with materials which have been pretty thoroughly explicated by others, and the author has faithfully reproduced some of the fruits of contemporary Luther studies.

The remainder of the book is spotty—good in some spots but weak and actually unreliable in other spots. The chapter on the Lutheran Church in Europe suffers from poor organization of materials within the sections (Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Other . . . Countries) and superficial and unbalanced treatment of the church's history in the various nations. For example, in tracing the course of the church in Denmark, he gives a fair account of the Danish Reformation in the sixteenth century and then jumps over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to discuss such nineteenth century leaders as Grundtvig, Kierkegaard, and Beck. The impression is left that nothing significant occurred in Denmark between the arrival of Bugenhagen in 1537 and the appearance of Grundtvig in the early nineteenth century. The Danes will not appreciate this at all. The story of the church in Germany suffers from an inadequate portrayal of the Ages of Orthodoxy and Pietism and a sketchy capsule treatment of the history of Christian thought to the present day.

Germans will be unhappy to see such typographical errors as *Das Wesen des Christentums* (*Christentums*) on p. 199 and

Landeskirken (*Landeskirchen*), on p. 216, von Thadden-Triegloff (Trieglaff) on p. 214, and Niemuller (Niemoeller) on pages 206 ff.

In the chapter dealing with the Lutheran Church in the U. S. A. the reader obtains a clear and accurate account of the ULCA, of which the author is a member. The discussion of other churches is marred here and there by errors in fact, if not also in interpretation. In describing the Augustana Church (Synod) he says (p. 332), "For fifty years, it was first a member of the General Synod and then of the General Council." As a matter of fact there was never any affiliation of the Augustana Synod with the General Synod. In 1852 the Synod of Northern Illinois, which included Swedes and Norwegians, became a member of the General Synod, but there was no Augustana Synod, as such, until 1860. It was ten years later (1870) that this body affiliated with the General Council. Swedish-Americans will be irritated to see the Swedish parliament called *Riksdig* (*Riksdag*) and to be told that Augustana altered its name in 1947, when actually this took place in 1948. Moreover, Söderblom did not originate the school of theology at Lund (p. 524). He and Einar Billing, properly called the fathers of modern Swedish theology, were both Uppsala men.

In perusing the account of the ELC, the informed reader will be exacerbated by minor inaccuracies: F. A. Schmidt is always called J. A. Schmidt; Laur.(entius) Larsen is called Laurance Larsen; H. G. Stub is called H. G. Stab; and so on.

The chronicle of "Lutheran Cooperation in the World" discusses the Lutheran World Federation and its predecessor, the Lutheran World Convention. The work of the LWF together with its quinquennial assemblies is adequately surveyed. Unfortunately, readers are left with the impression that the budget for the Third Assembly (Minneapolis, 1957) exceeded a million dollars (p. 604). As the one who hovered over that budget for two years, this reviewer can assure the author and others that the exact sum was \$324,-251.92.

On the whole, this is an interesting book,

and considering its scope, rather well done. However, as the above criticism indicates, it must be read with care and discrimination.

E. CLIFFORD NELSON

The Story of the Reformation. By William Stevenson. Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1959. 206 pages. \$3.50.

From a Scottish author comes this popular narrative of the Reformation. The author's twofold aim is to tell the story of that movement as a whole and to arouse further interest in it as well. The late John Baillie, as principal-emeritus of New College, Edinburgh, uses the foreword to remind the reader of Calvinist heritage that the Lutheran and Anglican phases of the Reformation also demand attention. With flowing style and skillful generalization Stevenson presents a full-orbed Protestant panorama, complete with Anabaptist beginnings on the Continent and Puritan developments in England. But nearly two-thirds of the book is devoted to Calvinism.

For the student who wishes to acquaint himself with the Reformation as seen by a glowingly partisan Scot of the older school this work is rewarding, for it sets the stage for a procession of more ambitious and learned works that in 1960 marked the quadricentennial of the Knoxian Reformation in Scotland.

E. THEODORE BACHMANN

Protestant Thought from Rousseau to Ritschl. By Karl Barth. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 430 pages. \$7.00.

The encyclopedic character of Barth's knowledge and the broad range of his interest and background are well evidenced in this significant volume. Prior to its translation into English it had already gained the reputation of being one of the definitive works on 19th century theology. Those inclined to think that Barth disposes of his theological opponents in a cavalier fashion are due for a real awakening as they read these pages. With amazing knowledge and justice he lets the 19th century representatives speak for themselves. His differences

from them bear the mark of being based upon thorough knowledge of their entire writings and a full grasp of their theological positions. In a passage bordering on the devotional Barth speaks of his indebtedness to his predecessors. "Regardless of my myriad opinions I must include these people in the Christian church. And in view of the fact that I myself, together with my theological work, belong to the Christian church solely on the basis of forgiveness, I have no right to deny or even to doubt that they were as fundamentally concerned as I am about the Christian faith" (p. 8).

Barth begins with a thorough and penetrating analysis of 18th century man as the "absolute man." He was the man who was forced into an awareness of the already immense world of human conquest. Instead of being humbled by the vastness of his world, man became the more boastful of his resources and his skills. The world was quite properly "his world" (p. 16)! But Barth sees through and behind this arrogance a fear and a yearning for something more satisfying than the lavish exchange of ideas or the beauty of 18th century artistry. Man's self-image consisted of one who took possession of everything around him and fashioned it in subjection to his will (p. 35).

The discussion of 19th century theology includes a careful and well documented analysis of the works of Rousseau, Lessing, Kant, Herder, Novalis, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, Strauss, and Ritschl. In each instance Barth succeeds admirably in his attempt to stand inside the thought world of the particular representative being discussed. He deals with each in turn in remarkable fairness, finally forcing them to answer or fail to answer the questions implicit in their own systems. Each discourse is worthy of careful study. Since Barth has often been cited as the avowed enemy of Schleiermacher, I will only review portions of this most worthy section of the entire work.

Barth rightfully senses that "what Schleiermacher constructed by means of his theology of awareness by planting himself in the center which for the Reformers had been a subsidiary center, could be the pure

eology of the Holy Spirit: the teaching man brought face to face with God by God, of man granted grace by grace" (341). He describes Schleiermacher's problem as follows: "The only question can now be, whether he will be in a position, in Trinitarian terms, to recognize and ensure as much validity for the divinity of the *Logos*, which forms his second center, as for the divinity of the Holy Spirit, which is his actual center or rather is apparently meant what he presents as his actual center" (341). He is of course skeptical of this endeavor, and he notices that it is precisely the opposite of the Reformers who began with the *Logos* as their center, from which they developed an essentially Christocentric concept of the Holy Spirit. If the *Logos* was divine, the Spirit must of necessity also be divine. But in Schleiermacher this central anchor is lacking. This causes Barth to wonder whether, in the final analysis, the divinity of the Spirit, so central for Schleiermacher, is really the divinity of the *Holy Spirit* (343). Is it not rather a deification of the common human spirit? He finally charges Schleiermacher with so confusing the religious consciousness with Christian consciousness that he actually ends up with redemption *without Christ*. The truth and content of the Christian religion is thus so diluted that it has nothing but "the feeling of utter dependence" as its highest expression (351). He senses that as the two foci (the *Logos* and the *Holy Spirit*) draw closer and closer, it is impossible to avoid the eclipse of the *Logos* by the *Holy Spirit*, and since that is permitted to happen, the Spirit loses its divine character and becomes instead a glorification of man's religious consciousness (352).

This is not the kind of volume one can use for after-dinner browsing. It is slow but rewarding reading. It will help correct many superficial accusations leveled against Barth. Henceforth no one can claim an adequate understanding of either Barth's position or his stature who has not entered this personal pilgrimage with him.

ARNOLD E. CARLSON

Meaning and Practice of the Lord's Supper.

Edited by H. T. Lehmann. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1961. 210 pages. \$3.50.

This is a symposium of great interest to all Lutheran pastors and professors. It is a historical survey of the meaning and practice of the Lord's Supper from New Testament times to the present. From the New Testament period (Robert Paul Roth) through the Middle Ages (T. G. Tappert) it is universal in its treatment and appeal, from the Reformation (Tappert) to American Lutheranism today (R. W. Deitz) it is directed specifically to the Lutheran reader. This brief, but deep, historical study is completed by an excellent essay by Martin J. Heineken in which the theological implications of the study are drawn. This essay, entitled "An Orientation Toward the Lord's Supper Today," is well worth the price of the entire book alone. As one would expect, there is no complete unanimity among the scholars. This is as it should be, for the facts, especially in the period of the New Testament and the ancient church, are sketchy and susceptible of more than one interpretation. But, by and large, there is a great area of agreement among the writers. A few criticisms seem in order.

First of all, the New Testament survey tends to cover too great an area—branching out to include the materials that legitimately belong to the ancient church (e.g., p. 10, where the *Didache* is quoted and discoursed on) while the texts of the New Testament, its prime concern, are rather lightly passed over (e.g., pp. 14-17). It seems strange that a scholar with an extensive knowledge of the New Testament should gloss over the New Testament evidence with a one-paragraph summary of their differences and similarities that contains only four points. This reviewer rejoices to find that Dr. Roth feels that Codex "D" (Codex Bezae, the shorter text of Luke 22) is corrupt, but is disappointed in not finding any attempt either to demonstrate its corruption or the genuineness of the *Textus Receptus*. In all, one feels that a more thorough treatment could have been given without undue expansion.

Dr. Vööbus' treatment of the ancient church is as thorough as could be desired, and interesting, too, in his dissent from the position of Dr. Roth. Vööbus does not consider "D" corrupt, but genuine (p. 42), and makes this assumption (as no evidence is presented to buttress this statement, it must be considered an assumption) the basis for a long and fascinating discussion of the wide varieties of meals celebrated in the ancient church. Such celebrations included those which used only bread (Acts 2:42, 46), and those which used water or added cheese, salt, etc. (p. 43, footnote 13). However, in the main, Roth and Vööbus agree when they come to the meaning of the Lord's Supper—and they present a very correct report, stressing as they do the eschatological significance early attached to the Lord's Supper.

Dr. Tappert's treatment of the medieval period is very interesting, and quite explanatory of the great reaction in Reformation times. The abuses of the Mass and the doctrine of transubstantiation are well documented and persuasive. The Reformation, Orthodoxism, and Pietism are deftly handled also. Dr. Deitz's scholarly treatment of American Lutheranism provides much food for thought, and ends with a challenge that our churches ought to accept and consider: "Perhaps it is worth asking whether it is not time for us to explore more fully the implications of the man-to-man communion which has been rather overshadowed in American Lutheran piety by preoccupation with the God-to-man dimension."

Dr. Heineken's enlightening essay captured this reviewer's heart on its second page (p. 170), where he states: "The meaning of the Lord's Supper, whatever its significance, must come out of the biblical witness itself and must be understood from the center of that witness, which is God's act in Christ." From that foundation he goes on to discuss every aspect of the Lord's Supper today and concludes: "In the Holy Communion . . . is embodied the life-together-in-love (*Liebesgemeinschaft*) for which God created and redeemed man at the price of his suffering and victorious love. . . . It is the sacrament of suffering and victorious love which nourishes the church" (pp. 202, 203).

Summing up: An excellent book. Don't let it pass by unread.

JOHN C. COOPER

The Eucharist and Liturgical Renewal. Edited by Massey H. Shepherd, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 146 pages. \$3.00.

The Reform of Liturgical Worship. By Massey H. Shepherd, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. 118 pages. \$3.00.

To the question, "How can vitality in the Christian life be revived?" the sacramentalist answer is given and aspects of the answer are earnestly explored in *The Eucharist and Liturgical Revival*. This theme, dear to Anglo-Catholic hearts, is devoutly discussed and fervently affirmed.

The prosaic fact is that the chapters of this book were addresses delivered at a liturgical conference at San Antonio in 1959. Most of the essayists were professors. Written for hearers as well as readers, the chapters have a speech vividness. The addresses discuss the Eucharist in relation to the church, the Bible, education, economic and social conditions, the laity, and the Eastern Orthodox Church. Assumed or affirmed throughout is the view that the Eucharist is central to Christian vitality.

This book by and for Episcopalians should enlarge the understanding and increase the appreciation of members of that communion with respect to the importance of the Eucharist. Lutherans will find in it a buffet of ideas suitable for Communion sermons. The chapter concerning the Eastern Orthodox Church with its emphasis on the totality of the sacrament and its sense of dramatic encounter will prove especially interesting.

However, for evangelicals, whether Episcopalian or Lutheran, the theme faces in the wrong direction. It is not simply that the Reformation is slighted (Luther is named once, disparagingly, and omitted from the anemic index), but the Gospel is ignored. The massive thrust of the Word which validates and vitalizes the sacrament is replaced by the eucharistic mass. God's sacra-

mental gift gets second billing; the top spot filled by man's doings listed as "Eucharistic action," "the oblation of our creatureliness," "the offering of our tiny daily sacrifices of self brought to the altar to be joined to His universal sacrifice." Against such subtle pelagianizing the Reformation reacted by rejecting what dares to obscure Christ.

This is an urbane book, designed for devotion rather than for controversy, marked by humility, self-criticism, and earnest dedication. A desideratum is as excellent a book with evangelical insights.

Professor Shepherd has scholarly competence both in church history and in liturgics. He combines these two attainments in preparing the 1959 Bohlen Lectures contained in *The Reform of Liturgical Worship*. His thoughts will appeal especially to Episcopalians and those interested in the ecumenical movement: to Episcopalians, because here is a history of revisions of the American Book of Common Prayer; to ecumenists, because he presents suggestions for a common liturgy.

After summarizing the present liturgical scene in Christendom he reviews the history of the ritualist movement, assesses the contributions of William Augustus Muhlenberg and William Reed Huntington, details the accomplishments of the last revision of the Prayer Book, and peers into the future for possible developments. All this leads up to his "ecumenical proposal" for an inter-church liturgy.

The reader of this book will see its meaning more quickly if he understands that "liturgical worship" is chiefly eucharistic worship. It is quite interesting to observe that there is a disposition to criticize and go beyond Cranmer. Praise is expressed for liturgical revisions formulated in the spirit and language of this century. Typical of Anglican comprehensiveness, Shepherd reverses the Lutheran position of expecting unity in doctrine and diversity in ceremonies; he prefers unity in liturgy amid diversity in doctrine. Yet he disparages uniformity in details.

The Service Book and Hymnal of Amer-

ican Lutherans elicits praise for its litany-type Prayer of the Church, for the introduction of an Eastern-inspired Kyrie, and for the freshness of its Prayer of Thanksgiving. His comparison of its Communion order with the latest of the Presbyterians, Methodists, and the Church of South India suggests the possibility of a fifty-year interconfessional study in the direction of a liturgy agreeable to all, even with varied theological interpretations at points.

This book, with its subtitle of "Perspectives and Prospects," is remarkably forward-looking. Tradition-minded Lutherans can benefit from it.

W. D. ALLBECK

Teaching Luther's Catechism, II. By Herbert Girgensohn. Translated by John W. Doberstein. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960. 130 pages. \$3.00.

Can it be that we have been so engrossed in making Luther's Small Catechism a manual of doctrinal instruction that we have overlooked the personal character of its contents? If true, as many of us suspect, we can then account for some of the inadequacies of our confirmation instruction. Judging from the heavy mortality rate among our "well indoctrinated" confirmands, something must have gone wrong in the instruction process. Perhaps it was over-balance of the careful and well-defined structure of content over the personal confrontation of the student with the living person of Christ, or maybe over the living nature of the fellowship of the members of the Body of Christ. To get this balance there is no call for minimizing the content or the careful defining of doctrine; but it is to suggest that these lose their meaning when unaccompanied by the dynamic of personal meeting. Nor is it to belittle the objectivity of the knowledge without which the Christian life has no moorings; nor is it to discourage the memorizing method in the teaching of the Catechism.

Obviously, though often forgotten, Luther intended that the Catechism should be an aid to the relationship between the pupil and Christ. Christ is the center of Luther's Catechism; and the pupil is the subject of

the maturing life in Christ. Because frequently this has been forgotten, and because there is a crying need for a recovery of the relationship concept in our nurturing program, there is a distinct contribution in Dr. Girgensohn's giving the church this second volume of his works on the Catechism. Most helpfully, it is a book not on methods but on an exposition of content; though the usual hope and expectation from pastors and church school teachers is for helps on "how to teach" rather than on "what to teach." Insights of the kind that the vulnerable Bethel professor has given should prove vastly more helpful than a listing of outlines and lesson aids.

This volume, translated by John W. Doberstein (who also translated the first volume of the series), includes lectures on Baptism, Confession, and the Lord's Supper. Under these signs it is the living Lord himself who makes himself known and with whom the pupil has to deal. The "person" character of grace emerges and makes for personal meaning in the sacraments. Grace is always a personal act, where both subject and object meet. A personal relationship is at stake in the sacraments, and in the administration of the sacraments this personal character must break through, or they become mere form. This is the crux of effective instruction in the church; and Dr. Girgensohn is remarkably clear and helpful in setting it in sharp focus.

PAUL M. LINDBERG

Vara Roller och Vi Sjalva. By Paul Tournier. Translated into Swedish by Christina Walder. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokforlag, 1957.

The Swiss psychiatrist, Paul Tournier, wrote this significant work in French under the title *Le Personnage et la Personne*. Its translation into other languages testifies to a widespread acceptance of the book itself as reflecting a willingness to see man in dimensions of the person, quite beyond Freud. The English translation, *The Meaning of Persons*, has found an enthusiastic reading response in America, where there is still a

painful working away from the purposeless clutches of the fatalistic pleasure principle. The translation into Swedish, done in most readable style, testifies also to the climate of psychiatry in the Scandinavian countries.

It has been rare to hear from a psychiatrist that "it is above all through the Bible, the book of the Word revealed and incarnate, that God speaks and personal contact with him is established." It indicates, at least, that we are reaching a point where real dialogue can be held between theology and psychiatry. The nature of the person is at the root of all meaning for both disciplines; and it is at this point that the focus must be made for dialogue and understanding between them.

For all who are concerned with living and working and living in the realm of real persons instead of the realm of mere things, there opens up a rich area of exploration. Psychology has opened new doors for theological exploration; and the quest becomes more exciting when led by those who, while scientifically trained, hold their firm roots in biblical revelation and the living person of the revelation.

PAUL M. LINDBERG

Creative Imagination in Preaching. Webb B. Garrison. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 175 pages. \$3.00.

Any book on sermon preparation reflects the author's conception of the nature of preaching, which in turn reflects his whole theological and ecclesiastical background. By the same token, any criticism of a book on homiletics reflects the critic's basic viewpoint and heritage.

This volume on "how to take the drudgery out of sermon preparation," the author's suggested sub-title, is based upon a concept of the sermon which is considerably different than that of most Lutheran homileticians. The author describes his purpose as not the traditional one of helping readers arrange material into sermons but the prior problem "of how to find ideas and illustrations." The focus of most of the book is "upon the sublime and mysterious process of creativity." To those who have a more definite theological structure for their sermons, and who

view the task of the preacher against a more defined scriptural message, this book might well appear as superficial and inadequate. The "ideas" in a more definitely professional sermon are not the product of stimulation of the creative process but aspects of a message divinely given to the church. However, the book is treated as a help in finding illustrative material—not the message—this book might be of help to us in our constant task of stating in ever fresh ways and in ever new approaches the Gospel of our Lord. The book is written in the style of advocates—a brief statement of an idea is followed by several illustrations. There is almost no development of any of the ideas. Perhaps the notion that sermon preparation consists of assembling material and illustrations makes this inevitable.

A. O. ARNOLD

The Crowds around Calvary. By William F. Beck and Paul G. Hansen. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1960. 120 pages. \$1.50.

William F. Beck, lecturer and visiting professor in the graduate department of Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, and Paul G. Hansen, pastor of Saint John's Lutheran Church in Denver, Colorado, have combined their efforts in this thoughtful, meditative book of Lenten devotions.

Dr. Beck explicates the meaning of the seven words from the cross as well as two questions posed by the risen Christ. These meditations are theological in content but devotional in appeal. They are not new in the sense of original insights, but they are new in the freshness of their appeal as well as in their practical relevance. The author moves rather deftly between the redemptive events of the first century and our appropriation of them in the twentieth century.

Pastor Hansen looks with imagination and writes with originality concerning the crowds around Calvary. In these thoughtful meditations the *kerygma* is central, but the author employs "sanctified imagination" in making the reader a member of the various crowds which he describes as Violent, Careless, Hate-Filled, Thrill-Seeking, Lonely,

Frightened, and Excited. To use the charmed word of our time, his preaching is "existential." The book is valuable for pensive, devotional reading.

CLAIR JOHNSON

Man and the Incarnation. By Gustaf Wingren. Translated by Ross Mackenzie. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959. 233 pages. \$3.75.

Gustaf Wingren is certainly one of the most prolific and provocative writers in contemporary theological circles. His recent works have shown a marked interest in the areas of creation and law. In a certain sense this stems out of his desire to establish a mediating position between the complete rejection of so-called "natural theology" manifested in the writings of Karl Barth, and the now defunct "philosophy of religion" approach which sees Christianity merely as the climax of all anthropocentric religions. In taking this position Wingren is confident that he is standing on essentially Lutheran ground. Students of Luther, aware of Luther's recognition of God's masks in nature, will be grateful for his contribution.

In this particular volume Wingren allows his study of Irenaeus to constitute the legitimate framework within which the whole doctrine of recapitulation is again revived. He considers Irenaeus to be one of the few who have been driven by his age to undertake the development of a thorough biblical anthropology. In opposition to the prevailing Gnostic views of his day, Irenaeus was forced to depend upon the Old and New Testament as the basis for his doctrine of man. He finds in the incarnation the *locus* of God's entering the world of men so that man knows himself to be actually sought by God. This then provides data of primary significance in developing his anthropology.

Irenaeus treats the doctrine of creation, of the temptation and defeat of man, and of the incarnation as the basis for the *recapitulation*, in which man is once again restored to the place which he occupied in the Creator's intention.

The special strength of Wingren's volume is seen particularly in his emphasis upon the

victory of Christ, through whom man's victory over his enemies—and particularly the devil—becomes a real possibility. Thus he can say that "Man has been created to live and not to die; and he reaches this goal of his humanity in the resurrection of Jesus. The resurrection life is not an unnatural addition to what is truly human, but is the uncorrupted life of creation . . ." (p. 120).

Wingren's interpretation of Irenaeus is carefully documented, as those familiar with Wingren's standards of scholarship would expect it to be. It is a closely knit argument that will be richly rewarding to those who give it the attention it rightly deserves. It represents a significant contribution to the renewed study of the doctrine of creation.

ARNOLD E. CARLSON

From Patriarch to Prophet. By Allen G. Wehrli. Philadelphia: The Christian Education Press, 1960. 207 pages. \$3.00.

The title is not an accurate indication of the purpose or of the nature of the contents of this book. It is not a comprehensive survey either of Israel's history or of Israel's religion. The author seeks rather to draw relevant lessons from a few selected characters and events in the Old Testament and to apply them in running commentary fashion to our own age. The informal style is that of the preacher rather than of the scholar. The author's concern is more with the application than with the interpretation of Scripture. Some of his applications are excellent; they grow out of the text and are truly relevant for today. At times the text seems to be little more than a pretext for launching into the sermonic application. The book reveals no awareness of the divine covenant with Israel and little if any real appreciation of the significance of "the saving acts of the Lord," without which men and events in the Old Testament cannot be seen in proper perspective. The result is that there is a "moralizing" and "psychologizing" rather than a "theological" quality to the interpretation, and also, of course, to the application. Of the three sections, on the patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets, the best is the one on Moses, "A Study in Dedicated

Leadership." The section on the prophets and sages is limited to four lectures on Habakkuk, Haggai, Proverbs, and Daniel. The thematic treatment given does unite these four in a significant way, but it is far too limited in scope to do justice to the biblical prophets in the uniqueness of their total ministry. The chief value of the book is in terms of a popular homiletical application rather than of deep theological insight in and interpretation of the Old Testament.

J. P. MILTON

A Lutheran Prayer Book. Edited by John W. Doberstein. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960. 146 pages. \$2.50.

Intended for personal and family use, this is a splendid and compact little aid in daily devotions. For morning and evening, and as other occasions arise, the helps are geared to the weekly round. Appropriately, this prayerbook makes excellent use of our Lord's Prayer and Luther's Catechism to exercise the life of devotion. Yet this is not all. The hymns for morning and evening, the Scripture readings for the church year, the text for the week, the prayers ancient and modern, combine to make this pocket-size volume a compact and convenient treasury of worship. The table of contents, index, and rubrics are clear, and the general scheme allows for appropriate variation.

E. THEODORE BACHMANN

The Pastor's Prayerbook. By Robert N. Rodenmayer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 319 pages. \$5.00.

The sub-title of this comprehensive work reads, "Selected and arranged for various occasions." After brief forms of prayer for morning, noon, and night follow twenty sections arranged according to various parts of the pastoral ministry. There must be few occasions which have been missed. The active pastor should find here a splendid "resource" for the differing aspects of his office and work as a parish leader. The prayers are wisely chosen and well edited. Professor Rodenmayer has provided full notes on the prayers, which are numbered, and also indexes of

jects and authors. While most of the prayers are from Episcopal sources, there are many others of different origin. It is good to find several prayers from Lutheran authors included in the book.

GEORGE R. SELTZER

Contemporary Pastoral Prayers for the Christian Year. By Nathanael M. Gup-till. Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1960. 151 pages. \$2.50.

This collection of prayers is intended to cover the usual days and festivals of the church year, as well as others of a social, organizational, or promotional character which have clustered around it. They are of the free-church variety, and from the left side at that. The best parts of the prayers are those which come from Holy Scripture or from the standard devotional repertory of the church. Much of the rest is conversational or rhetorical or homiletical and out of keeping with the dignity and solemnity of public worship.

GEORGE R. SELTZER

Academic Illusion. By Denis Baly. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1961. 179 pages. \$2.25.

Anyone who has followed the lively but extended discussion of the "university question" might well ask, Is there need for another book on the troubles of the academic world? Those who read *Academic Illusion* are apt to answer, Yes. This answer will be given not because neatly packaged remedies are provided for all academic ills, and not because new ills have been diagnosed; not because the trouble spots are so skillfully laid bare and the relevance of Christian faith and doctrine so ably shown.

The strength of Baly's critique lies in his recognition that the illusion from which the academic world suffers is not limited to the academic world. The relation of classroom teaching to the "real" world outside is an important aspect of the problem, but the need is not simply to make the one relevant to the other. They *are* relevant, and this is part of the difficulty; for the relevance consists in their partaking of the "same char-

acter of illusion. . . . Any attempt to relate directly to a society which is a structure of illusions, and which is increasingly the victim of its own self-image, is inevitably condemned to be itself illusory" (pp. 74, 75). What is needed is the courage to face the "structure of illusions" for what it is, both in society at large and in the academic world in particular.

It is here that Baly sees the relevance of the "Christian argument." The Christian faith provides the basis for this courage. It is the "reassuring doctrine . . . of the irresistible judgment of God" that makes it possible for the Christian to see that "every apparent evidence of security must be withdrawn, or even overthrown, and sacred and eternal cities be reduced to rubble, that illusion may be seen to be illusion, and only that which is sure remain" (p. 114). What Christians may less readily acknowledge is that the integrity of the college or university requires that the Christian faith be tested, too. "It is essential that the Truth be tested, and it must need be that the Christ suffer. . . . We must not forbid God to be Christ. We must not hinder him from being seized and put on trial, from being castigated, made fun of, and nailed up on a blackboard as a public display. Only then, indeed, can we see whether he is, or is not, illusion" (p. 115). The source of the courage to ask every question is the Incarnation event, which also makes it possible to live and act within the illusory situation and to transform it.

The main argument of the book follows the lines indicated above, but there is much of value to which this brief statement does not do justice. The summary of Christian doctrine, which goes beyond the needs of the central argument, is well worth reading in its own right. The relating of creation and Incarnation is especially well done and is also the part most germane to the book as a whole.

What has been delineated here as the argument of the book may not be true to the author's intent, for the structure of the work is its weakest point. Some chapters give the impression of having been independently conceived and executed, with repetitions resulting when they were joined

together. If the thesis was meant to be as stated above, the book proper ends with Chapter VI, the last four chapters being addenda—relevant and valuable, but not involving any further development of the thesis.

In spite of this weakness, there is no doubt about the value of the book. Baly's exposure of academic ills is trenchant and valid and to some may be painful; but, then, the Truth he proclaims was never meant for creatures with only minor ills.

CARL FJELLMAN

The Making of a Minister. The Autobiography of Clarence E. Macartney. Edited by J. Clyde Henry. Great Neck, New York: Channel Press, 1961. 224 pages. \$3.00.

The author wrote this interesting but unpretentious account of his own life shortly before his death in 1957. Four years before his death he had retired from the pastorate of First Presbyterian Church in Pittsburgh, where he had served for more than twenty-six years after an equally distinguished ministry in Arch Street Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Noted as a preacher, Macartney

will be remembered especially for his uncompromising conservatism in the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy in which he was a prominent figure.

Cranmer's Selected Writings. Edited by Carl S. Meyer. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1961. 109 pages. Paper, 6 s.

A compact and discriminating selection from the writings of Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury, is here made available in inexpensive form for the use of students and other interested readers. Edited by the professor of Historical Theology in Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, who has already established himself as a specialist in the English Reformation, this little volume helps to make clear the extent to which Cranmer was indebted to the continental Reformers in his theological orientation. Selections from his writings illustrate his views on justification, faith and works, the authority of the Scriptures over against the Church Fathers, and the sacraments. A few letters and prayers are added to show something of the archbishop's political and liturgical interests.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

